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DETERMINING WHETHER 
PROPERTY IS NECESSARY FOR 
AN EFFECTIVE 
REORGANIZATION: A PROPOSAL 
FOR THE USE OF EMPIRICAL 
RESEARCH 
By Charles Shafer* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The automatic stay1 is considered one of the most 
important provisions of the Bankruptcy Code for Chapter 11 
debtors.2 It is the shield behind which the debtor may go about 
the process of reorganization using the mechanisms provided by 
the other sections of the Code.3 The stay permits a debtor the 
time to formulate a repayment or reorganization plan.4 
Resisting a challenge to the stay is, therefore, often crucial 
to the reorganizing debtor. By preventing the initiation or 
pursuit of legal action against debtor, the stay allows the debtor 
to devote its limited time and resources to the reorganization 
process. By preventing creditor seizure of essential property, the 
stay prolongs the debtor's survival. By the same token where the 
debtor has no hope of reorganizing in a way to benefit creditors, 
the stay is a needless interference with the ability of creditors to 
protect their rights. Where that is the case the stay contributes 
to what many claim to be a serious problem in the bankruptcy 
* Charles Shafer is a Professor of Law, at the University of Baltimore 
School of Law; Professor Shafer has a B.A., from Marietta College (1967); a 
J.D., from Rutgers University, Newark (1978); and an LL.M. from the 
University of Illinois (1984). 
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system: The use of Chapter 11 by debtors to fritter away estate 
. assets in a hopeless attempt to revive the business,5 
For this reason it is not surprising that litigation involving 
the automatic stay consumes such a large part of the bankruptcy 
process,' This litigation usually takes the form of motions for 
relief from the stay,7 The vast majority of cases involving the 
automatic stay involve efforts by creditors with either contrac-
tual or judicial liens to obtain possession of property in the 
hands of the debtor.' The Code provides two bases for the 
seizure of property. The first basis is the lack of "adequate 
protection of an interest in property, II S This refers to protection 
of the value of the collateral in which the secured creditor has an 
interest,10 For example, if the secured creditor can demonstrate 
that the property is likely to depreciate in value to the point of 
reducing the amount of the debt secured by the value of the 
property, the court will find that the secured creditor is not 
adequately protected from the risks inherent in the automatic 
stay.11 Where the court finds a lack of adequate protection, the 
court will either provide some sort of additional protection 
(such as periodic payments to compensate for the depreciation, 
insurance coverage or liens on additional property) or grant 
relief from the stay to permit the creditor to seize the property.12 
The second basis for relief from the stay, contained in 
Section 362 (d)(2), involves a two-part test. The first part 
requires the creditor to prove that the debtor has no equity in 
the property.13 As the Court in In re Koopmans14 indicated, 
there is a divergence of opinion over what constitutes "equity" 
within the meaning of Section 362(d)(2)(A). If the property is 
worth $100,000 and the lien of the party requesting relief from 
the stay secures a claim of $120,000, there would be no question 
that the undersecured creditor could establish that the debtor 
has no equity in the property. Similarly if the property is worth 
$100,000; the moving creditor has a secured claim of $40,000 
and creditors having secured claims senior to the moving 
creditor have secured claims for $80,000, the debtor would be 
determined to have no equity in the property. However, if the 
property is worth $100,000; the moving party's claim is for only 
$80,000 and the claims of other junior lienors are for $40,000, 
the creditor requesting relief from the stay is oversecured but 
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the debtor does not have equity in the property. Nevertheless, 
some courts would hold that in the latter case the "equity" test 
is not met.15 This requires an interpretation of the word equity 
to mean that the word is intended to be restricted to the 
relationship of the debtor and moving . creditor. One court 
explained such an interpretation by stating that: 
"There may be many instances when the holder of a lien 
inferior to the lien of a plaintiff does not want relief from the 
stay afforded to the plaintiff. In a foreclosure a junior 
lienholder is faced with the possibility that unless it 
purchases the interests of those holders of superior liens it 
will lose any recovery upon its lien. The junior lienholder may 
prefer to negotiate with the debtor for different terms or a 
reduction in the amount due to it. "16 
However, the majority interpretation appears to be that the 
determination of whether the debtor has equity in the property 
is reached by valuing the property itself and then valuing all of 
the liens (not just the moving creditor's lien) attached to that 
property. 17 That approach, in the view of this writer, is the 
better position. It comports with the clear statutory language 
which expresses the standard from the debtor's perspective. 
Once a secured creditor is willing to expend the effort to 
challenge the reorganization, it is appropriate for the court to 
determine the necessity of the property for a reorganization. In 
the context of that dispute the court will decide whether the 
undersecured portion of the junior lienholder claim is better 
protected by allowing the sale or not.16 
If the debtor has no equity in the property, the debtor must 
also be able to establish that the property is H necessary for an 
effective reorganization. H 19 It is the meaning of that phrase 
which the balance of this article will explore. It is important to 
emphasize that by deciding cases under Section 362(d)(2) the 
court may be doing more than resolving a dispute between one 
secured creditor and the debtor. By determining that the 
secured party may seize the property the court will in all 
likelihood prevent the debtor from continuing with the reorgan-
ization process.20 Section 362(d)(2) is, therefore, one of the 
provisions which allows the court to serve as a "gatekeeper", 
determining which debtors may continue to use the protection 
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of Chapter 11. Decisions under Section 362(d)(2) thus take into 
account considerations which are relevant to and have conse-
quences for all creditors. 
ll. ESTABLISIDNG A STANDARD 
In reported decisions disputes regarding the interpretation 
of the words "necessary for an effective reorganization" have 
essentially involved one significant legal issue:21 How should the 
courts determine whether the property is necessary for sllch a 
reorganization? 
Courts and commentators often deal with the issue of 
defining the necessity of property for an effective recovery as if 
it merely involves the choice between two alternative tests: the 
"necessity" test and the "feasibility" test.22 The "necessity" test 
in essence asks "If the debtor is to reorganize, would the 
property in question be necessary?"23 The "feasibility" test is 
stated in a variety of ways but essentially it requires the debtor 
to satisfy the court that there is a "reasonable possibility of a 
successful reorganization within a reasonable time." 24 One 
example will illustrate the difference between the two tests. 
Assume the debtor operates a factory which· produces slide 
rules.25 If First Bank has a $1,000,000 claim secured by a 
mortgage on the factory building worth $750,000, the debtor 
would have no equity in the building. The courts which adopt 
the "necessity" test would presumably limit their inquiry to 
whether the debtor needs the building if the debtor were to 
continue in business. The answer would in all probability be yes. 
Note that there would be no inquiry regarding the potential 
market for slide rules. The courts which adopt the "feasibility" 
test however, might inquire into factors such as the competence 
of the debtor's management,26 the potential market for slide 
rules,27 or the reliability of the debtor's income projections28 to 
determine the whether the court believes the debtor will in fact 
be able to reorganize successfully. 
The label for the feasibility test is derived from the fact 
that an effective reorganization would have to involve a 
confirmed plan. One of the statutory requirements for confirma-
tion of a plan, is that "confirmation of the plan is not likely to 
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be followed ... [by] the need for further financial reorganiza-
tion. . .. " 29 This language is meant to restate the requirement 
in the Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act that plans be 
"feasible. " 
Courts which adopt the "feasibility" standard do so in part 
because the word "effective" in Section 362(d)(2)(B) seems to 
require something more than just determining that the property 
could be used in a reorganization30 and in part because the 
likelihood of a successful reorganization was required to deny 
relief from the stay under the Bankruptcy Act. Moreover, as one 
court stated, "It seems pointless and wasteful to deny relief from 
the stay because of the relationship of certain property to a 
reorganization that will never occur . . .. " 31 
There are a number of arguments used to support the 
"necessity" test. The language of the statute itself, of course, 
only refers explicitly to whether the property is "necessary" and 
not to whether a reorganization is feasible.32 The issue of 
whether the court should grant relief from the stay often comes 
up early in the bankruptcy case. It may be unfair to the debtor, 
soon after the petition has been filed, to expect the debtor to 
provide sufficient data to establish that a successful reorganiza-
tion would be likely. Such a requ~rement could be seen as 
contrary to the purpose of the automatic stay, i.e., giving the 
debtor a period of "breathing room" to determine the appropri-
ate course to follow and to negotiate with creditors.33 The 
legislative history of Section 362(d)(2) indicates that Congress 
was concerned not with the rehabilitative aspects of the debtor 
but rather with an attempt to protect secured creditors interests 
in certain types of property.34 Finally the procedure involved in 
resolving issues regarding the stay indicate a Congressional 
intent that the range of matters relevant to the court's decision 
would be quite narrow. First, the statute provides for an 
expedited decision making process and, second, the bulk of the 
debtor's creditors are unlikely to be involved in the litigation. 
These procedural factors would appear to mitigate against 
decisions which involve long range considerations of the likeli-
hood of the debtor's surviva1.35 
The Supreme Court in what might be considered dicta has 
recently indicated that the "feasibility" test is the correct 
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standard.- In fact the Court's opinion hinted at an even stricter 
stance by stating that the test required granting relief from the 
stay unless "property is essential for an effective reorganization 
that is in prospect. "37 The Court's discussion of necessity for an 
effective reorganization arose as it was deciding the issue of 
whether adequate protection includes the requirement that 
undersecured creditors receive payments for the interest on the 
value of the property during the pendency of the bankruptcy 
proceeding. The Supreme Court held that such payments were 
not required and in the process observed that secured creditors 
are protected from unnecessary delay in seizing and selling 
property by the requirement that the debtor could not retain 
property not necessary for an effective recovery. The Court's 
pronouncement regarding the standard for Section 362(d)(2)(B) 
could be labeled dicta since the only statutory language at issue 
was "adequate protection" in Section 363(d)(1).38 However, it 
can also be argued that the Court's statement is not dicta 
because, the Court's construction of Section 362(d)(2) was 
necessary to its conclusion that undersecured creditors have a 
reasonable means of protection despite the fact that "adequate 
protection" does not include pendency interest.39 
Despite the "feasibility" test's status as. the majority rule 
and despite the test's apparent endorsement by the Supreme 
Court in Timbers, some recent cases have adopted the necessity 
test.40 One Court cited the "growing number of courts adopting 
the neces.sity test" in adopting that test itself.41 
Although, as we have seen, an argument can be made to 
support either interpretation of Section 362(d)(2) on the basis 
of legislative intent, the basic policy underlying Section 
362(d)(2) is that the property at issue should not be used at the 
secured creditor's risk unless that property would assist the 
rehabilitation effort. It may not be necessary to go so far as to 
say that the property must have higher value in a rehabilitated 
company than in a sale by secured creditor.42 There may be 
other social policy considerations that dictate allowing the 
property to remain in the hands of the debtor, if the debtor will 
be able to use the property.43 But there is no reason to leave the 
property in the debtor's hands if the property can not be put to 
some beneficial use. 
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The secured creditor's interest is at risk when the debtor is 
in bankruptcy. The scope of that risk is determined· under 
Section 362(d)(1), adequate protection. That risk having been 
determined in the context of adequate protection, litigation 
under Section 362(d)(2)(B) is appropriate to determine in which 
situations the secured creditor's interest should be put at risk. 
Therefore, Section 362(d)(2)(B) is a place in the statute where 
the balancing of the interest of the secured creditor against the 
interest of the debtor and unsecured creditors takes place. The 
important point to emphasize is that no matter what standard is 
used for Section 362(d)(2)(B) the secured creditor will be at risk 
of not doing as well as it would if permitted to seize and sell the 
collateral. Those situations are present where the debtor and 
unsecured creditors have a sufficient chance of profiting from a 
successful reorganization. This analysis places litigation under 
Section 362(d)(2)(B) in its proper context of preventing the use 
of the automatic stay to prolong those bankruptcy proceedings 
which are likely to accomplish no more than a dissipation of 
estate assets. The "necessity" test as stated seems to call for the 
rather bizarre result that a conceivable but improbable reorgani-
zation would justify denying the secured creditor the right to 
relief from the stay. In other words, .absolutely no likelihood of 
success is necessary. This standard cannot be justified. Why 
should the secured creditor be placed at risk if no one will 
profit?44 The fact that the Section 362(d) hearing provides the 
court with limited information is not an argument that the 
likelihood of success should not be considered but merely that 
the court must be mindful of the limited amount of information 
at its disposal. 
However, it is questionable whether those decisions which 
adopt the It necessity" test actually stand for the proposition 
that even where there is virtually no chance of a successful 
reorganization, debtors should be able to retain property. In 
most cases where the court espouses the necessity test the court . 
also indicates, at least by its statement of the facts, that it 
believes the business has a likelihood of success.4S Therefore, 
often even the necessity test courts are basing their decision on 
a prediction of the debtor's successful reorganization. Therefore, 
the necessity test as expressed could be viewed as· merely a 
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requirement of a very low level of probability that the debtor 
will succeed.46 , 
The "feasibility" test has the advantage of directing the 
court's attention to the prospects for a successful reorganiza-
tion. To that extent the test appears more in line with the 
underlying policy of the Section advanced earlier. The problem 
with the test as currently stated is that none of the formulations 
of words commonly used in defining the "feasibility" test give 
the bankruptcy court sufficient guidance in determining 
whether to grant relief from the stay. First, courts differ in the 
nature of their articulation of the test.47 Second, what is a 
"reasonable" possibility of a successful reorganization? If it is a 
requirement of a probability of success, what is that probability: 
51%, 25%, 75%, 90%?48 
The fact that the word "reasonable If is often used in law 
does not make it any more helpful. In torts the duty of care 
required is one of "reasonableness". But that is translated to 
slightly more objective standards such as a general average form 
of conduct or conduct which involves taking that protection 
warranted by its cost. But here no such translation has been 
supplied. 
Consistency in judicial decision making requires that we 
establish the level of risk to which "reasonable" refers. One 
possible standard would be that the level of risk which is 
warranted by the potential benefit to the secured creditor if 
relief is denied. But since the secured claim will never exceed 
the value of the collateral,49 the secured creditor will never 
realistically achieve any benefit greater than the amount of the 
secured debt. Therefore the secured creditor will never obtain a 
recovery that is greater than the amount which it would obtain 
if relief from the stay were granted immediately. 
Another possible way to <determine the amount of risk 
which is reasonable would be to determine if the potential 
benefit to the debtor and unsecured creditors is warranted by 
the risk to the secured creditor. One would multiply the chance 
of success times the potential gain to the debtor and unsecured 
creditors. If the product exceeds the value of the collateral at 
risk, the secured creditor would be denied relief. 50 Such a test 
has the peculiar result that. the greater the potential gain to 
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debtors, the greater risk to be allocated to secured creditors. For 
example assume a business which manufactures acoustic guitars 
has sought bankruptcy protection. A significant problem is the 
popularity of electronic instruments. Assume a secured creditor 
is at risk to lose $100,000 if the stay is not lifted. If the potential 
profits from a successful business is $200,000, a 50% chance of 
survival would be sufficient for the court to deny relief from the 
stay. If the business profits would be $400,000, only a 25% 
likelihood of success would be needed. It seems grossly unfair to 
allow the debtor to place the secured creditor at greater risk 
where the debtor stands to make a large profit. In fact, the 
reverse would seem to be in order. 
From what has been said so far it is apparent that the 
meaning of "necessary for an effective reorganization" in 
Section 362(d)(2)(B) involves the court making a prediction of 
some likelihood of success. What remains to be established is 
the level of probability which should be required. The fact that 
the Code requires some probability of success and that the Code 
places the burden of proof on the debtor to establish that the 
standard is met,51 requires that the standard probability be 
greater than 50%. However, there i~ no law or policy which 
would require a greater probability. Hence it appears that where 
it is more likely than not that the debtor will reorganize 
successfully (Le., a 51% probability of success)52 the debtor 
should be permitted to continue to use the property and relief 
from the stay should be denied. 53 
Requiring the debtor to show only a 51 % probability of 
survival may seem unfair to the secured creditor. It is common 
to think of the secured creditor as the possessor of a property 
interest which should not be subject to the risk of the 
vicissitudes of the debtor's struggle.54 The resolution of issues 
regarding secured credit on the basis that the secured creditor 
has a property interest neglects the fact that it is a function of 
the law to define property interests.55 Rather it is more helpful 
to see the secured creditor as one participant in the bankruptcy 
case, a participant with certain procedural rights but also a 
participant which must itself bear some of the risks and costs of 
the bankruptcy proceeding. 
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The mere requirement that property subject to a security 
interest can ever be denied the secured creditor simply because 
the debtor needs it, represents a recognition that secured 
creditor interests can be limited to benefit unsecured creditors. 
The Supreme Court has recognized that there are times when 
the secured party must be placed at risk to the benefit of 
unsecured claims and equity interests.1i6 It is also not sufficient 
to argue that the secured creditor's protection under the 
Bankruptcy Code should be equivalent to that creditor's rights 
outside of Bankruptcy. This argument springs from the position 
that Bankruptcy law should not provide an incentive for any 
party to use bankruptcy to improve that party's rights in 
relation to other parties. Rather, bankruptcy should only be 
used to increase the value of the enterprise for all creditors.1i7 
However, it may be that there is no more appropriate (or at least 
politically practical) place for the Congress to govern the rights 
of secured creditors than in the context of the Bankruptcy 
Code.58 
To flesh out the proposed standard a little more it needs to 
be more clearly articulated what is meant by a "successful 
reorganization." First, would it include merely a confirmed plan 
or only a plan which was successfully completed? Since the· 
policy underlying Section 362(d)(2)(B) is to balance the inter-
ests of the debtor and unsecured creditors against the secured 
creditor, the court must consider the possibility that the debtor 
and unsecured creditors will realize a profit. No profit is realized 
on confirmation. From the perspective of the unsecured credi-
tors a successful reorganization requires completion of the plan. 
This conclusion is based on the premise that a plan requires 
that unsecured creditors receive at least what they would have 
received in a liquidation, forli9 it may seem unnecessary to 
require that the court in determining whether there will be a 
successful reorganization must base its judgment on the predic-
tion of a completed plan not just a confirmed plan. It may be 
argued that the two judgments are identical because the court's 
decision to confirm the plan requires the court to determine 
"feasibility" which is also a prediction of success. That may be 
true. But it is also possible be that "feasibility" decisions are not 
always made with the care they should be. Since the balance of 
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this article will include a method of supplying the courts 
guidance in making predictions regarding success it is important 
to be clear that success is to be judged on the basis of successful 
completion of a confirmed plan. 
We have seen that for a court to decide whether or not 
property is necessary for an effective reorganization, it must 
determine whether the business in question has a probability 
greater than 51% of succeeding. In a sense, the court is being 
asked to predict whether the business will succeed or fail. The 
task of predicting this is quite different from the more conven-
tional judicial fact finding job of determining whether or not a 
particular event occurred in the past.so 
Once we recognize that the dispute involves predicting 
success, it is apparent that absent a crystal ball, courts must 
look to evidence of present or past acts to determine what is 
likely to happen in the future. It is likely that some factors are 
better than others at helping to predict. It would seem appropri-
ate for courts to look to some source of knowledge, be it the 
judge's experience, other bankruptcy cases or studies of busi-
nesses in bankruptcy, to see what factors are better at aiding the 
prediction process. Although courts do cite a variety of factors 
for finding that the debtor will or will not succeed, this writer 
has not found a single decision involving a Section 362(d)(2) 
dispute in which the court referred to any authority of any kind 
regarding the reliability of a particular factor in predicting the 
outcome of Chapter 11 reorganizations. In the third section of 
this article, I will discuss a study of the reliability of factors 
courts have used and my proposal for the collection and use of 
additional data. 
The importance of formulating a definition of "necessary" 
for a successful reorganization in this article is twofold. First, it 
emphasizes that the court is being required to predict, or at least 
determine the probability, that a particular result (successful 
reorganization) will occur. The definition is also important 
because it provides courts with a standard to pursue. It may not 
be possible to do so with precision, but the adoption of a clear 
standard will make it possible to attempt to measure the success 
of judges in determining whether property is necessary for an 
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effective reorganization and to provide judges with guidance in 
making that decision.61 
The standard is thus formulated in a way which makes 
empirical research helpful in evaluating and assisting judicial 
decision making. 
ID. EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
This article has argued that the appropriate standard for 
establishing whether property is necessary for an effective 
reorganization requires the court to determine whether the 
debtor business is more likely than not to survive. This article 
has also suggested that courts should make that judgment on the 
basis of factors which are proven indices of success or failure. 
The next step is to see to what extent courts have successfully 
predicted the success or failure of businesses and what factors 
appear to be most helpful in making the proper decision.62 I 
have attempted in two studies to explore those questions. 
There have been a number of helpful recent empirical 
studies of Chapter 11 bankruptcies.63 However these studies 
have not dealt directly with the issues to which this article is 
directed. Although two recent studies of Chapter 11 businesses 
indicated that it would be important to find ways to identify 
businesses that were more likely to succeed and businesses more 
likely to fail, neither study involved isolating the factors which 
might serve as predictors of success or failure.64 Furthermore, 
although both studies attempted to measure the amount of 
creditor opposition to debtor behavior neither study dealt with 
specific types of opposition (such as relief from stay or motions 
to convert or dismiss). 
The two studies which I conducted were exploratory in 
nature, directed more at determining whether empirical 
research could be helpful in this regard and, if so, how that 
research should be conducted. In what I refer to as the 
"National Study, n I examined reported cases dealing with 
whether property is necessary for an effective reorganization. In 
other words, I began with a list of cases which I knew dealt with 
the issue in question. In the "Maryland Study n I sampled 
bankruptcy cases filed in the Baltimore office of the District of 
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,Maryland to see how often the issue of "necessary for an 
effective reorganization" is dealt with by the court. In other 
words, in that study I began with the bankruptcy filings to find 
cases which dealt with the issue in question. 
A. THE MARYLAND STUDY 
Cases for the years 1984, 1985 and 1986 at the Baltimore 
office of the District of Maryland were selected. Those years 
were selected so that sufficient time will have elapsed since the 
cases were filed to allow for measurable activity. However, I did 
not go back any further since data is often not available on older 
files.65 Twenty-five percent of the cases filed in each year were 
selected. The obvious limitations of this study is that cases from 
only one district of the country can not be considered represen-
tative of the economy, legal practice or judiciary of the nation as 
a whole. 
Approximately 25% of the files for each year were selected 
at random.66 Although I was prepared to study in great detail 
the decision making process in a similar manner to the National 
Study it became apparent that the small number of cases 
involved made analysis on that basis 'Of little value. The study is 
useful primarily as a vehicle for determining the extent to which 
the issue of the relief from the stay for the seizure of property is 
presented to the court and the extent to which courts must 
actually determine whether or not property is necessary for an 
effective reorganization. 
The results of the Maryland Study are exhibited in Table II 
The conclusion is that in the Baltimore office of the District of 
Maryland motions for relief from the stay are filed in 69.903% 
of the Chapter 11 Bankruptcy cases. Since in some cases 
motions for relief are filed more than once, there is an average of 
almost one motion for relief filed in each case. In 95% of the 
motions for relief there is a request for the seizure of property.87 
In about 62% of the motions for relief, Section 362(d)(2) is 
presented as at least one basis for relief.66 However, in the vast 
majority (87%) of those cases, the parties reach a settlement or 
the case is rendered moot for some other reason. In other words, 
even though the judge may sign an order, it is a consent order. 
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In order to study the judicial decision making process, only 
those cases in which the court was actually presented with a 
dispute, heard arguments and decided whether property was 
necessary for an effective reorganization would be relevant. But 
that only happened seven times. 
That fact that judges appear to decide the issue of whether 
property is necessary for an effective reorganization in such a 
small number of cases presents a problem for extrapolating from 
the Maryland Study to the nation as a whole. The reason is that 
any statistic derived from these figures will have a margin of 
error.19 For the Maryland study, the figures set forth above need 
to be qualified by the appropriate margin of error. For example, 
the statement that motions for relief were filed in 69% of the 
cases has a margin of error of 6%. Since 105 cases were studied 
and the total population of Chapter 11 cases filed annually 
nationally is about 20,00070 (and even if we could assume that 
the Baltimore office was a microcosm for the nation as a whole) 
we could only draw the following conclusions: Each year 13,600 
± 1,771 motions for relief are filed and of those motions for 
relief 10,600 ± 1,771 allege that property is not necessary for an 
effective reorganization. Only 1,333 ± 1,90371- of those motions 
require judicial decision making. There are 190 ± 370 grants of 
relief based on the property not being necessary for an effective 
reorganization and 1,143 ± 885 denials based on that issue. The 
reason for setting forth these numbers is to demonstrate that if 
the Maryland Study is any indication of how many times the 
issue of whether property is necessary for an effective reorgani-
zation is actually decided by judges, a sample large enough to 
have a relatively small margin of error would be required. For 
reasons outlined in the accompanying note,72 to be of use a 
study would have to involve the examination of at least between 
5,000 and 10,000 bankruptcy files. The purpose of such a study 
would be to analyze grants and denials of relief from the stay 
. along the same lines as was done in the National Study.73 Since 
such a large number of files would have to be examined the 
sampling of cases filed at bankruptcy courts around the country 
would probably be an inefficient method of observing the 
operation of Section 362(d)(2).74 Moreover, such a study would 
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face all the problems obtaining necessary information which are 
discussed with regard to the National Study. 
B. THE NATIONAL STUDY 
"The National Study" involved following up every reported 
bankruptcy decision since 1984· dealing with the issue of 
whether property was necessary for an effective reorganization. 
For each case an attempt was made to determine the character-
istics of the business which was being reorganized and the 
factors which influenced the judge in deciding whether or not 
the property was necessary for an effective reorganization. After 
reviewing a number of decisions the factors which courts 
appeared to rely on in predicting the success or failure of the 
business were converted to a series of statements about busi-
nesses, such as "The management of the business is competent; 
There is a market for the business' product or service. 1I75 Each 
decision was read to determine whether the Court indicated that 
any of the statements would be true or false about the business. 
An attempt was made to conclude whether the Court was 
predicting the success or failure of the business. Then an 
attempt was made to discover what actually happened to the 
property involved in the dispute and the business involved in 
the reorganization.76 The goal was to discover if any of the 
factors which judges cited appeared more or less suitable as 
predictors of successful reorganizations. This study operated 
under a number of constraintS which rendered its results useful 
only for the exploratory purposes outlined above. First, it is not 
possible to draw any conclusions about how representative the 
selected sample is. It is not known what percent of judicial 
decisions on this issue are reported.n Furthermore, it is not 
known whether characteristics of the case which are significant 
in determining eventual success or failure have any influence on 
the judge's decision to prepare a reportable decision. 
Second, working with reported decisions created a difficulty 
in preparing the data for analysis. It is not always possible to 
conclude with certainty what factors the judge is considering in 
making the decision.78 Some Courts were not clear with regard 
to whether they were predicting success or failure. Moreover, 
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determining whether a business had in fact succeeded was at 
times difficult based on the response of the attorneys. 
Third, it was difficult operating on a modest budget to 
conduct a very searching follow up of each case. In order to 
encourage lawyers to respond to the study the questionnaire was 
limited to a request for a very limited amount of information. 
Table III sets forth the cases studied, the factors which the 
Courts considered, the Court's prediction and the result. Table 
IV analyzes the success of each factor in predicting success. 
C. HOW SUCCESSFUL ARE COURTS IN PREDICT-
ING? 
As indicated in Table IV, the National Study reveals an 
overall success rate of 56%. The rate would be higher if those 
cases for which no follow-up information was available were 
excluded from the study. However, it was concluded that there 
is a likelihood that the failure of the lawyer to respond or the 
inability to locate the lawyer might be an indicator that the 
business did not succeed. It could be argued that a success rate 
of 56% might be achieved by chance. But the fact that other 
studies indicate that less than 30% of Chapter 11 cases actually 
succeed,79 leads to the conclusion that the demonstrated success 
rate is greater than what would be achieved by chance. 
Therefore, this appears to indicate that Courts are correctly 
denying relief from the stay in those cases were it is more likely 
than not that the business will succeed. However, there are two 
ways in which the National study may exaggerate the apparent 
success of the courts. 
First, there is the problem of determining when there is a 
success. The information upon which the study is based is 
largely supplied by the debtors' attorneys. No effort could be 
made to verify that information. No documentation was 
requested.80 Lawyers were explicitly told that they could rely on 
their best recollection of what happened. It is possible that a 
debtor's lawyer would intentionally or unintentionally give an 
incorrect response.S1 Furthermore, many of the cases that were 
the subject of the study had not reached their final conclusion. 
As noted in column 8 of Table III there. are a variety of 
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responses which were tabulated as successes. The case would be 
characterized a success if the debtor had completed a confirmed 
plan, appeared to be successfully complying with a confirmed 
plan or was successfully operating under Chapter 11 even 
though a plan had not been confirmed. To have limited the 
definition of success to only those cases completely complying 
with a confirmed plan would have produced too few cases to 
analyze.82 
Second, it must be kept in mind that the standard 
advocated in this article is that the court should deny relief in 
each case where there is a 51% likelihood of success. The 
standard is not stated that courts should strive to achieve a 51 % 
success rate.83 In other words, courts should be looking at each 
case and determining whether the business is in the group of 
businesses all of which have a 51 % chance of survival. There-
fore, if the courts were predicting accurately we would expect to 
see a success rate at least slightly higher than 51%. 
It is not possible with the data presently available to 
determine whether that standard has been met. The reason is 
that there is insufficient knowledge regarding the likelihood of 
success of all Chapter 11 debtors. The reason this is crucial can 
be explained in the following examples which are illustrated in 
Table IA. Suppose that we could identify each business in 
Chapter 11 as belonging to one of 10 classes. Each class contains 
10 businesses. Class I businesses have a 10% chance of survival. 
Class II businesses have a 20% chance of survival, etc. Given the 
standard of 51% likelihood proposed earlier, neither Class I or 
Class II businesses would survive motions for relief from the 
stay under Section 362(d)(2). However Class VI businesses 
which have a 60% chance of survival would survive the Section 
362(d)(2) test. Since there are 10 businesses in Class VI and 
Class VI businesses have a 60% survival rate, 6 businesses would 
survive. Table IA reveals that with the given distribution 50 
businesses would survive Section 362(b)(2) and of those 60 
businesses 40 would survive. That would be a survival rate of 
80%. However, by changing the distribution of the businesses, 
as is done in Table IB, 73% would survive. There is currently no 
way of knowing the real distribution of businesses. If we were to 
strike Section 362(d)(2) out of the statute for a number of years, 
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we would produce a sort of control group which would give us 
the needed data for particular years. Since that is an unlikely 
approach we must acknowledge that we do not know what 
success rate to expect if judges are correctly deciding Section 
362(d)(2) cases. We know that it should be greater than 51% 
and less than 100%. It might be reasonable to expect some sort 
of distribution like Table IB if only because it assumes few 
Chapter 11 businesses have extremely high chances of survival. 
If courts are being too lenient with debtors, the success rate 
would be lower. But if courts are being too strict (i.e., not 
allowing debtors to continue even if there is a 51% chance of 
success) we would see a higher success rate. For example, if the 
conditions of Table m represent the .real world of Chapter 11 
businesses, courts should be denying relief from the stay for all 
debtors in Classes VI through IX. But if courts were only 
denying relief for debtors in classes VIII through X the success 
rate would be about 87%. 
Cases where Courts granted relief from the stay were also 
studied. If courts are predicting accurately, very few of those 
businesses would succeed. The reason for this is that the 
granting of relief from the stay is in all likelihood a self-fulfilling 
prophecy.84 Since in almost all cases the property at issue is 
absolutely essential for the debtor's survival, the grant of relief 
from the stay will "sound the death knell to a debtor's 
rehabilitation efforts." despite the fact that the debtor could 
have survived if protected by the stay.as If Table IA were a 
correct picture of relevant businesses, relief would be denied to 
businesses in Classes I-V. If allowed to continue, 15 (30%) of 
those businesses would succeed. But even the potentially 
successful ones would probably fail after relief from the stay is 
granted. In a number of instances debtors were able to find 
financing to retain the property and continue operating. This~ 
might indicate situations where courts were too strict with 
debtors. But overall, in this study the success rate of businesses 
for which relief was granted was a fairly low 9%. 
It is likely, also that the probability of business survival is 
subject to the general business cycle. As the economy improves, 
the mean survival rate would go up and as the economy declines 
the mean survival rate would decline. 
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D. PREDICTIVE FACTORS 
Unfortunately the number of cases bearing on each factor 
in the National Study is too small to make reliable conclusions 
regarding the likelihood that particular factors are or are not 
useful as predictors of successful reorganization. The results are 
nonetheless interesting. The following analysis will give the 
reader an idea of the kind of analysis which might be appropri-
ate for a study with more data such as the one proposed in the 
last part of this article. 
(1) Type of Business and Size of Business 
Both the Missouri and Wisconsin studies identified the 
type of business (manufacturing) and the size of business as 
factors which seemed to have a high correlation with success in 
Chapter 11.86 In reviewing the decided cases under Section 
362 (d)(2) it was not possible to confirm or refute those 
conclusions. Courts gave no information regarding the size of 
the business (either in terms of number of employees or amount 
of assets). Hence, courts never used the size of the business as a 
factor to consider in determining whether the reorganization 
would likely be successful. Courts often (but not always) 
mentioned the nature of the business, but never used that as a 
factor to consider. 
(2) Technical Analysis vs. Personal Analysis 
One way of sorting out the factors would be to look at those 
factors which involved the judge analyzing some sort of business 
data and making a judgment regarding prospects for business 
success (I label this n technical analysis ft) as opposed to those 
categories where the judge merely looks at the management of 
the business and gauges its apparent competence or experience 
Cpersonal analysis"). An example of technical analysis would be 
where the court considers the potential market for the product 
or the sufficiency of the capital available to the debtors. An 
example of personal analysis would be where the court considers 
whether the debtor's management is competent or experienced. 
For example, in the study the judges' success in predicting was 
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higher when based on management being competent, the 
business being established and management being experienced 
than for predictions based on business forecasts, sufficiency of 
capital and the business having addressed the causes of bank-
ruptcy.87 It appears that the "personal analysis· was the more 
successful method of predicting success. This seems counterin-
tuitive. One might expect that where. a court explores the 
technical financial structure of the business, the court would 
make a more-informed, better decision. However, a plausible 
explanation for the survey results may be twofold. One reason 
may be that judges are ill-equipped to make decisions on the 
more technical aspects of the case. It may also be that the 
presence of competent, experienced people, interested in staying 
involved in a business, acts as a good indicator that the business 
is viable. It would be interesting to see if a more extensive 
survey such as it advocated in the last part of this article 
supports this conclusion. 
(3) Potential Objections 
An interesting question is whether the court should con-
sider potential objections to a plan even though confirmation of 
the plan is not at issue. In other words, suppose a creditor says, 
"The plan will probably require X and we will object to X and 
the plan will not be confirmable over our objection." It appears 
that courts by and large ignored such arguments.88 The study 
seems to support that policy. It appears that if a business has 
the ability to survive it will be able to negotiate with the 
potentially recalcitrant creditors. 
(4) Stage of the case 
Many courts state that where the motion for relief from the 
stay is filed soon after the debtor has filed the petition, the court 
will be reluctant to grant relief from the stay. This is because the 
debtor is entitled to a breathing period. Courts often state the 
dividing line between when the debtor will be entitled to a more 
relaxed standard and when the debtor will be required to submit 
more convincing evidence of viability as the period during 
which the debtor has the exclusive right to file a plan. Although 
98 
PROPERTY IN REORGANIZATION 
the code does indicate that the debtor during those 60 days shall 
be free to file its own plan, it is hard to understand that the 
mere fact that it is early in the case should be a sound predictive 
factor for success. In fact, if early in the case it is apparent the 
debtor cannot succeed there is no more reason to deny relief 
from the stay than if it is apparent later in the case. Therefore, 
it seems anomalous that in the study courts which cited the 
n earliness" in the case were generally successful in predicting 
success. This can be explained by the fact that in most of the 
cases citing thiS as a factor the courts also cited other factors as 
predictors of success. Therefore, it appears that courts correctly 
used the stage of the case as a method to gauge the showing that 
a debtor needed to make for the stay to remain in effect, but did 
not really use this as a predictive factor.89 
(5) Progress Towards a Plan 
Courts which focused on the fact that debtors were making 
progress towards confirming a plan did not appear to fare well as 
predictors of successful reorganizations. This may indicate that 
it is better to focus on business itself.90 
(6) Combinations of Factors 
Given the small number of cases it was not possible to 
determine how various groupings of factors might be helpful in 
predicting. For example, although the study suggests that 
"personal n factors may be better predictors than "technical n 
factors, the study could not reveal whether some combination of 
technical and personal factors would be useful. A study which 
had larger numbers of observations of various combinations of 
factors might be susceptible to the regression analysis which 
would be helpful on this point. 
E. CONCLUSION 
It appears that there is presently not sufficient data for 
determining the extent to which specific factors are useful in 
predicting whether a business in Chapter 11 is likely to be 
successful or not. To obtain the necessary information from a 
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sample of files in bankruptcy courts would require sampling a 
vast amount of files. Pleadings and court orders often do not 
provide enough information. However, there does not appear to 
be sufficient numbers of reported cases to obtain statistically 
reliable data from that source. Also such a study is dependant on 
the cooperation and reliability of the attorneys who respond. 
Finally, the judges themselves do not appear to focus on all 
potentially relevant factors and often give insufficient informa-
tion to allow the reader to determine the standard the judges are 
applying or the reasoning for the conclusion that the standard 
has or has not met. However, based on the Missouri, Kansas, 
and national studies it appears that a comprehensive study 
would be capable of providing a method for testing the predic-
tive quality of various factors. 
IV. PROPOSAL FOR EMPffiICAL RESEARCH 
To this point it has been demonstrated that the application 
of the appropriate standard in determining whether or not 
property is necessary for an effective reorganization would be 
enhanced by empirical research which identifies those factors 
which are the best predictors of the success or failure of the 
Chapter 11 debtor. However. to date this data is not available 
for bankruptcy judges. Although the administrative office of the 
courts does collect data regarding bankruptcy cases, that 
research does not involve the type of information required here. 
Other empirical research conducted in this area suggest that 
this is an area needing study. The two studies conducted in 
connection with this article suggest that such studies might be 
useful but demonstrate the limitations of research using infor-
mation currently available. Random sampling of bankruptcy 
files would require the examination of thousands of files around 
the country. It would probably be an extremely inefficient 
method of obtaining the necessary information. The use of 
reported decisions is hampered by the inadequate number of 
decisions on this issue which reach the case reports. Both 
methods would be of limited value for two other reasons. First, 
judges do not always clearly report the factors they examined 
and rarely cite more than one or two factors. They ignore factors 
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which may be of value. Second, studies would be dependent on 
the memory of participants and the availability of court records 
long after cases have been closed. Despite the paucity of data, 
bankruptcy appears to be an area of the law particularly 
susceptible to empirical research. Courts are continually 
involved in the reorganization of a business. At each stage 
information can be collected. There is a similarity about 
bankruptcy cases which may be absent from other areas of the 
law. 
For these reasons, it is suggested that the most appropriate 
way to conduct a study to determine how to predict the success 
or failure of a business in Chapter 11 would be to enact a court 
rule requiring all bankruptcy· courts to make findings of fact 
regarding factors determined to be the most likely predictors of 
success and to specify the degree of probability which the judge 
regards as required for a finding that property is necessary for 
an effective reorganization. The proposed rule would read as 
follows: 
In all Chapter 11 cases, whenever the Court must 
decide whether property is necessary for an effective 
reorganization under § 362(d)(2) .. [whether a plan complies 
with § 1129(a)(11), or whether a case should be dismissed 
for under § 1112(b)(i)]91 the Court shall explicitly make 
fmdings of fact on the following issues:" 
(a) The number of employees of the debtor. 
(b) The cause of the bankruptcy filing. 
(c) The amount of the debtor's assets. 
(d) The nature of the debtor's business. 
(e) Whether the debtor has corrected the cause of the 
filing of the petition. 
(1) Whether the debtor is currently operating the 
business in an appropriate manner. 
(g) Whether the debtor is making appropriate pro-
gress is preparing a plan of reorganization. 
(h) Whether the debtor has a reliable prediction of 
future business success. 
(i) Whether the property is necessary for the pro-
posed reorganization. 
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(j) Whether the debtor plans to have sufficient capi-
tal. 
(I) Whether the management of the debtor's business 
is experienced and competent. 
(m) Other factors which the court deems relevant. 
(n) The likelihood that the debtor business will be 
able to fully comply with a confirmed plan (if the 
court concludes that such a finding is relevant).93 
The United States Trustee's office could then conduct the 
necessary follow-up to determine what actually happened in 
each bankruptcy case in which such a finding was made. The 
appropriate statistical analysis could be conducted to determine 
which factors served as the best predictors of success and to give 
a general idea of how well courts are doing in predicting success. 
The study would be continually updated as cases are resolved. 
The results of the proposed study would be made available 
to each bankruptcy judge as he or she is deciding a case which 
involves making a prediction regarding the successful reorgani-
zation of the debtor. The judge (unless bound by an appellate 
court decision on the matter)94 would be free to use the study as 
he or she likes in making a final decision. But. presumably each 
judge would attempt to be guided by the findings regarding the 
predictive value of various factors and by the determination of 
whether the courts are successfully identifying Chapter 11 
debtors with a H more likely than not If chance of survival. 
There are four problems which must be resolved in order to 
conclude that conducting and using the study described above 
would be proper. Those problems involve the propriety of the 
court rule described, the involvement of the United States 
Trustee and the use of the study by courts and the validity of 
such a study. 
A. THE RULE 
With regard to the propriety of the proposed rule, it should 
be noted that it dictates only a procedural requirement. It does 
not require that the judge's decision must use or weigh the 
factors in any way. As such, the rule has no substantive effect.95 
The study would reveal the success rate of judges in predicting 
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success or failure in the Section 362(d)(2) contest. The study 
would reveal the factors which seem to be the best predictions. 
Judges could then use the study as guidance. 
The reason for advocating a study to be used for guidance 
only is that it would be difficult to establish criteria which could 
be universally applied in each bankruptcy case. Rather, it would 
be more appropriate for the bankruptcy judge to determine to 
what extent particular factors should be weighted in particular 
cases. However, the judgefs decision would be informed and 
guided by the results of the empirical research. This is the 
appropriate way to use this type of empirical research given the 
nature of the study and factual variation of cases. 
B. THE UNITED STATES TRUSTEEfS INVOLVE-
MENT 
It is well within the authority of the United States Trustee 
to determine the status of cases and property for the purposes of 
the study.96 The United States Trustee could request all 
bankruptcy courts to notify the United States Trustee office 
whenever a proceeding implicating Section 362(d)(2) has begun 
so that the trustee could appear as party to introduce before the 
court the results of the empirical research.97 
C. THE USE OF THE STUDY BY COURTS 
Even if the use of the empirical research proposed would be 
confined to limits of the studis validity, it is not readily 
apparent that it would be proper for courts to consult a research 
study in deciding particular cases. Although it has been sug-
gested that empirical research should play a larger role in 
developing bankruptcy policy,98 these suggestions involve pri-
marily legislative policy making. The study proposed in this 
article would be used in judicial fact-finding. 99 This use of 
empirical research would fit into the category of n social frame-
work n as defined by Professors Laurens Walker and John 
Monahan.1OO They created the term to apply to n the use of 
general conclusions from social science research in· determining 
factual issues in a specific case. ff101 This use of empirical 
research is quite different than the uses to which it is tradition-
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ally put. Those traditional uses include determining ft legislative 
facts« and n adjudicative facts. ft 
An example of the use of empirical research for the 
resolution of legislative facts by the Supreme Court occurred 
where the Court determined that the issue of whether to apply 
the exclusionary rule should be resolved by weighing the costs 
and benefits of the rule. The weighing process involved examin-
ing social science research concerning the effects of the exclu-
sionary rule.102 An example of the use of social science research 
in dealing with adjudicative facts involved the use of a survey 
conducted to determine whether the defendant manufacturer of 
a toy car copied so many of the characteristics of the car used in 
the Dukes of Hazzard television series that children would 
believe that the defendant's car was in fact the Dukes of 
Hazzard car.103 The important point is that in deciding a 
legislative fact the Court deemed it appropriate to look to 
research of a general nature and that in deciding an adjudicative 
fact the Court used only research which was conducted to deal 
with the specific facts of the case at bar. 
An example of ft social framework ft involved the proposed 
use by a defendant of published studies on factors which affect 
the accuracy of eyewitnesses to refute the state's eyewitness 
testimony.104 Another example involved the use by prosecutors 
of social science experts to testify regarding behavioral traits 
"typically" observed in abused children in order to prove that a 
particular child· was sexually abused.106 The distinguishing 
feature of the use of empirical research in the last two cases 
from the Dukes of Hazzard case is that research of a general 
nature was used to resolve a particular factual issue of a specific 
case. Similarly the proposed use of empirical research advocated 
by this article involves data regarding business success generally 
to be used to resolve the question of the likelihood that a 
particular business will have an effective reorganization. 
The use of research proposed here is very similar to the 
process of estimating the future wages lost by an individual who 
is negligently injured or killed. In such cases statistics regarding 
the average income of people of a similar age and similar 
occupation of the plaintiff are cited.106 
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D. "VALIDITY" OF THE STUDY 
The study is proposed to help courts predict the likelihood 
of a business surviving the Chapter 11 proceeding by providing 
courts with empirical research that is tailored to the needs of 
the judge. However, there are several potential problems with 
the proposed study which must be addressed. They relate to 
causal analysis, proper identification of variablest reliability and 
internal and external validity. 
First, the study proposes no causal explanation for business 
success or failure. Prediction requires n an understanding of the 
underlying processes and relationships that govern a phenome-
non. Understanding involves knowledge of the full set of causal 
relationships that underlie a phenomenon, including the ways in 
which various factors combine or interact to produce or alter it. 
Thus, the search for causes lies at the heart of the scientific 
enterprise. n 107 This points up two defects of the proposed study. 
First, it does not spring from any hypothesized explanation of 
success or failure. As a result the selection of factors which this 
article suggests be studied (i.e., the questions that the judge be 
required to ask) cannot be defended on any grounds other than 
that these are factors which judges have looked to in the past or 
that these are factors which other studies identified. It may be, 
thereforet that there are other factors which would be better 
predictors of success or failure.108 
A second problem resulting from the failure to include a 
causal explanation is that the study is therefore of more limited 
use by courts in predicting future successes or failures. For 
example, suppose the study concludes that the judge's observa-
tion of competent management is a high predictor of success 
and that the judge's observation of a small business is a high 
predictor of failure. How does the judge rule where both factors 
are present? If each of those factors is related to a well-thought-
out causal explanation, the judge would be better able to apply 
the study's findings to the facts of the case at hand.109 Although 
in discussing each of the factors in the prior section of this 
article suggested some reasons have been suggested for the 
validity of each factor, these do not amount to the complete and 
thorough causal explanation which would be helpful. It must be 
105 
ANNUAL SURVEY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 
kept in mind that the issue is not just why would a business 
succeed or fail in the abstract but why would they succeed or fail 
in a Chapter 11 proceeding. Such an explanation must take into 
account the dynamics of a Chapter 11 proceeding. For example~ 
the size of the business may be significant in Chapter 11 because 
it relates to the amount of creditor interference in the reorgani-
zation process. 
One response to these arguments is that the study itself (or 
future studies) may be helpful in developing some causal 
explanation which could lead to further refinement of the study 
proposed here. But it is important to recognize the defects in 
the proposal so that the study's limitations can be accurately 
understood and so that work can continue on refmements and 
improvements. Another response is that empirical research can 
be of value absent an understanding of causal relationships. For 
example, Manahan and Walker relate the story of the British 
Navy's control of scurvy by recognizing a correlation between 
the outbreaks of the disease and whether ships were stocked 
with citrus fruits prior to the discovery of vitamin C.l10 
Insurance actuaries often confme themselves to recognizing 
relationships between measurable observations and subsequent 
events without needing a causal explanation. 
A second general problem presented by this proposal 
concerns the precise identification of the independent and 
dependent variables to be studied.lll In the proposed study the 
n dependent n variables would be the success or failure of the 
business. The n independent II variables would be the factors to 
be tested as predictors of success or failure. It is important that 
all variables have "operational defmitions." liTo be sure that 
each person knows exactly what the other person is talking 
about when he or she reports the results of social science 
research, it is necessary to define variables being studied clearly 
and precisely . . .. The universally accepted way to define 
variables . . . is to specify the procedures or operations to 
measure them. "112 In addition it must be specified, "what 
interpretations we are going to make on various possible 
observations.113 
With regard to the dependent variables (the success or 
failure of the business) the identification proposed (has a 
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confirmed plan been fully complied with 1) would be satisfactory 
as an operational definition but may be susceptible to dispute on 
policy grounds.i14 
The independent variables present greater problems with 
regard to their value in drawing statistical conclusions. For 
example the variable defined as "Is the debtor currently 
operating the business in an appropriate manner?" presents 
great difficulty. To be truly reliable, that is to have consistent 
observations, would be almost impossible. The variety of 
business types, structures and problems are so great that it 
would not be possible to specify exactly what data is to be 
observed and exactly what interpretations are to be made on 
each possible observation. In order to assure such consistency 
the variable actually being measured is "Did the judge believe 
that the business was being operated in an appropriate man-
ner?" Since each judge will be required to report only his own 
observation there is consistency. Although when understood in 
this way the study is reliable, the question of its "internal 
validity," i.e., whether the measurements truly reflect the 
phenomenon studied is called into question.i11i In a sense the 
problem would be referred to as the "threat of instrumentation. n 
The study will be combining the conclusions of many different 
judges in one study. The mitigating factors are the presumptive 
independence and sophistication of bankruptcy judges as well as 
that in deciding matters each judge has the authority to 
question all knowledgeable parties and obtain answers under 
oath.116 In this sense the bankruptcy judge's observations may 
be of more value than that of a graduate student pouring over 
court documents operating with better defined standards. The 
judge's power and position, therefore, may compensate for the 
lack of clear operationally defined definitions of, for example, 
proper operation of the business.117 
Finally there is the problem of the n external validity n of the 
study, i.e., whether the inferences drawn from the study can be 
applied to groups beyond those actually studied.ii8 For example, 
the potential success of differing businesses would presumably 
be different depending on conditions in the economy as a whole. 
Nevertheless the study would certainly be useful in comparing 
the relative weight to be given to various factors. After data has 
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been collected over a sufficiently long period to measure the 
results through changes in economic cycles it would be of even 
greater value. 
CONCLUSION 
The policy advocated in this article is beset by difficulties. 
It can not provide immediate II relief. II It will take time before 
any meaningful statistics. are available. The statistics will be 
qualified by the various judicial interpretations of the statutory 
standard and the vagaries of national and regional business 
cycles. But bankruptcy in its present form has been around for a 
long time and will in all probability be around for a long time to 
come. While the data is first being gathered it is hoped that the 
rule suggested will cause judges to articulate a clear standard of 
the probability of success they are requiring and direct judicial 
attention to the need to consider all relevant factors in the 
prediction process. When the statistics are first available they 
will provide judges with guidance based on the realities of the 
bankruptcy process .. 
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APPENDIX 
TABLEIA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Number Number Number 
that will court will that will 
Number Chance survive if deny survive if 
of of all relief stay cut 
Class Businesses Survival continue from stay is 51% 
I 10 0.1 1 0 0 
I 10 0.2 2 0 0 
III 10 0.3 3 0 0 
IV 10 0.4 4 0 0 
V 10 0.5 5 0 0 
VI 10 0.6 6 10 6 
VII 10 0.7 7 10 7 
VIII 10 0.8 8 10 8 
IX 10 0.9 9 10 9 
X 10 1.0 10 10 10 
Total 100 55 50 40 
Success Rate (Total Col. 6/Total Col. 5) 0.80 
TABLE m 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Number Number Number 
that will court will that will 
Number Chance survive if deny survive if 
of of all relief stay cut 
Class Businesses Survival continue from stay is 51% 
I 10 0.1 1 0 0 
I 20 0.2 4 0 0 
III 30 0.3 9 0 0 
IV 40 0.4 16 0 0 
V 50 0.5 25 0 0 
VI 50 0.6 30 50 30 
VII 40 0.7 28 40 28 
VIII 30 0.8 24 30 24 
IX 20 0.9 18 20 18 
X 10 1.0 10 10 10 
Total 300 165 150 110 
Success Rate (Total Col. 6/Total Col. 5) 0.73 
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TABLE Ie 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Number Number Number 
that will court will that will 
Number Chance survive if deny survive if 
of of all relief stay cut 
Class Businesses Survival continue from stay is 51% 
I 100 0.1 10 0 0 
I 90 0.2 18 0 0 
III 80 0.3 24 0 0 
IV 70 0.4 28 0 0 
V 60 0.5 30 0 0 
VI 50 0.6 30 50 30 
VII 40 0.7 28 40 28 
VIII 30 0.8 24 30 24 
IX 20 0.9 18 20 18 
X 10 1.0 10 10 10 
Total 550 220 150 110 
Success Rate (Total Col. 6/Total Col. 5) 0.73 
TABLE ID 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Number Number Number 
that will court will that will 
Number Chance survive if deny survive if 
of of all relief stay cut 
Class Businesses Survival continue from stay is 51% 
I 100 0.1 10 0 0 
I 90 0.2 18 0 0 
III 80 0.3 24 80 24 
IV 70 0.4 28 70 28 
V 60 0.5 30 60 30 
VI 50 0.6 30 50 30 
VII 40 0.7 28 40 28 
VIII 30 0.8 24 30 24 
IX 20 0.9 18 20 18 
X 10 1.0 10 10 10 
Total 550 220 360 192 
Success Rate (Total Col. 6/Total Col. 5) 0.53 
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TABLE II ~ 0 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ~ 
~ 1984 1985 1986 TOTAL 
1 Total Cases Filed 127.00 161.00 176.00 464.00 
..... 
Z 
2 Total Sampled 31.00 40.00 34.00 105.00 
E!3 2a Percentage Sampled 2/1 0.24 0.25 0.19 0.23 
3 Sampled cases where mlr filed 22.00 26.00 24.00 72.00 0 
4 Percentage of cases where m/r filed 3/2 0.71 0.65 0.71 0.69 E5 
5 Total sampled mlr 38.00 30.00 27.00 95.00 >-
6 Average mlr per case 5/2 1.23 0.75 0.79 0.90 Z ..... 
7 Total mlr requesting property 36.00 30.00 24.00 90.00 N >-
I-' 8 Percentage of mlr requesting property 7/5 0.95 1.00 0.89 0.95 >-3 
I-' 9 Total mlr alleging NER 21.00 19.00 16.00 56.00 
..... 
I-' 0 
10 Percentage of mlr alleging NER 9/5 0.55 0.63 0.59 0.59 Z 
11 Percentage of mlr req. prop. alleging NER 9/7 0.58 0.63 0.67 0.62 
12 NER cases requiring court 1.00 1.00 5.00 7.00 
13 Percentage NER cases requiring court 12/9 0.05 0.05 0.31 0.13 
14 Court grants relief 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
15 Percentage NER where court grants relief 14/12 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.14 
16 Court denies relief 1.00 1.00 4.00 6.00 
17 Percentage NER where court denies relief 16/12 1.00 1.00 0.80 0.86 
18 AVG/yR 
19 TOTAL CASES FILED NATIONALLY 19560 23374 24740 22558 
20 TOTAL M/R NATIONALLY 5/2 X 19 23977 17531 19646 20410 
21 TOTAL NER NATIONALLY 9/2 X 19 13250 11103 11642 12031 
22 TOTAL M/R REQUIRING COURT 12/2 X 19 631 584 3638 1504 
23 TOTAL NER RELIEF DENIED 16/2 X 19 631 584 2911 1289 
TABLE III 
1 2 3 4 5A 5B 5C 5D 6 7 8 9 10 
BUS -ClTE- FACTORS A N R 
NO. TP PR YR VL PG C I M N P R P P R 
1 T P 88 85 524 N HK D D 31 S S 
2 S 87 78 852 Q IMO X G 65 F F 
3 W P 87 74 837 L X G 56 F F 
4 A P 86 74 111 EK P C D 35 S S 
5 E R 87 74 65 M L X D 56 X F ~ 
6 E R 87 73 511 AN G ? 55 F F 



























11 E R 87 69 837 AK DE X G 55 F F ~ 
12 R 86 68 416 0 X G 31 F S ~ 13 R 86 68 309 JK X G 31 F S 
14 E ? 86 68 549 X G 35 F S ~ 15 E R 86 68 256 G G 55 F F 
16 S R 86 69 248 MN X G 31 X S t:J:j 
17 S P 86 67 629 D D 56 X F ~ 
18 P 86 66 543 Q G G 15 F N ~ 
19 A R 86 66 894 DEFK P X D 35 S S ~ 20 R R 86 65 819 Q EM X G 65 F F 





















































2 3 4 5A 5B 5C 5D 6 7 8 9 10 "0 !;I:I 
BUS -CITE- FACTORS A N R 0 
NO. TP PR YR VL PG C I M N P R P P R ~ 
27 S P 86 63 809 EFMO X D 31 S S 
~ 
>< 
28 A P 86 63 163 X G 56 F F .... 
29 A P 86 62 604 X G 1 F N Z 
30 R P 86 62 176 M L X D 65 X F ~. 31 A R 85 62 115 G D 35 S S 
32 R R 60 283 X G 1 F N 0 !;I:I 
33 A P 59 762 C G 56 S F 0 
34 A A 86 58 296 EO X D 31 S S ~ 35 F I 85 58 201 EGN C D 56 S F 
36 A R 85 57 366 Q KO X R 35 F X ~ 
..... 37 85 53 623 N C D 31 S S ~ ..... 38 S R 85 52 816 M C D 55 L F 0 c:.:l 
39 E R 85 52 715 JQ GI C D 31 S S Z 
40 S A 52 509 N EGJ G G 56 F F 
41 E 85 51 360 C X G 65 F F 
42 A R 85 51 640 CIJO C ? 0 X N 
43 A P 85 50 988 F EG X D 31 S S 
44 S R 83 49 644 EGN X D 65 S F 
F 
45 E R 48 910 ANO C D 65 S 46 
U P 85 48 74 G G 65 F F 
47 I 83 31 796 MN X G 23 X N 
48 S R 85 47 614 MN X D 42 .8 8 
49 A R 83 33 176 I C D 0 8 N 
50 R 83 34 549 NO X G 55 F F 
51 8 R 82 26 628 N X D 45 8 S 
52 E R 82 22 395 EHM L X D 42 X 8 
53 8 R 84 46 500 N X G 56 F F 
1 2 3 4 5A 5B 5C 5D 6 7 8 9 10 
BUS --CITE­ FACTORS A N R 
NO. TP PR YR VL PG C I M N P R P P R 
54 S R 84 46 892 GHJ G G 56 F F 
55 E R 84 45 473 AKN D D 44 X S 
56 A R 84 45 574 N EGI G G 31 F S 
57 A R 84 45 469 CMN X D 42 S S 
58 S R 84 44 186 A CDEFJ X G 55 F F 
59 E R 84 44 151 AL M G G 55 F F 
60 A R 84 43 522 N G D 35 X S ~ 









































































































































































































































105 R C 80 4 635 IJ G G 54 F F ~ 
.:'! 
--
1 2 3 4 SA 5B 5C 5D 6 7 8 9 10 1-d 
~ 
BUS -CITE- FACTORS A N R 0 
1-d 
NO. TP PR YR VL PG C I M N P R P P R t.rJ 
106 U R 80 5 558 IKM X D 43 S S 
~ 
0< 
107 R R 80 5 578 DE C D 2 S N ~ 
108 E E 80 5 605 N D D 43 X S Z 
109 A R 80 6 13 FJO C D 44 S S ~ 110 E E 80 6 855 J G G 55 X F 
111 E R 80 6 518 GIN X D 55 S F 0 
112 S R 80 7 725 GJO X G 56 F F ~ 113 S R 80 7 866 LMN D D 42 S S 
114 S P 81 10 37 GH G G 56 F F Z ~ 
115 M R 81 9 738 EGJ G G 56 F F 
~ ..... 116 I 81 10 373 GJO C D 56 F F ..... 117 R B 81 10 783 N EHJ G G 56 F F 0 01 118 S R 80 11 148 AN X D 65 X N Z 
119 T P 81 11 224 EHJ D D 65 S F 
121 E R 81 12 77 11 X D 33 S S 
122 E R 81 13 624 N EGJ X G 54 F F 
123 M C 81 14 51 0 G G 56 F F 
124 E R 81 14 524 G X G 55 F F 
125 E R 81 15 55 HN D D 2 S N 
126 X I 81 16 123 C D 54 X F 
127 R I 81 16 174 0 X D 56 S F 
128 S R 82 16 404 HO G G 56 X F 
129 S R 81 16 598 D D 65 X F 
130 E R 82 17 662 EGJ X G 56 F F 
131 E R 82 21 624 GJO G G 15 F N 
132 E R 82 20 717 H D D 43 S S 
133 E R 82 21 624 GJO G G 15 F N 
134 S R 82 22 161 Q D D 64 S F 
1 2 3 4 5A 5B 5C 5D 6 7 8 9 10 
BUS -CITE­ FACTORS A N· R 
NO. TP PR YR VL PG C I M N P R P P R 
135 C P 82 22 975 EN X G 3 F N 
136 E R 82 23 230 N X D 45 X S 
137 S P 82 24 24 N D D 44 X S 
138 E R 82 25 171 X G 2 F N ~ Z139 A R 82 25 271 N X D 53 X F c:
140 E R 82 66 55 NO C D 56 S F 
141 A R 83 26 152 Q CN X G 3 F N ~ 
I-' 142 S R 83 26 280 HNO X D 54 S F 00 
I-' c:a':I 143 E R 83 27 510 H X G 54 F F 
144 E R 83 29 115 KNO X G 56 F F 
145 U I 83 30 763 0 X G 42 F S ~ 
to<:146 S P 83 32 523 H 0 D D 56 S F 
147 A R 83 34 14 N E D D 65 S F 0 
i'2j148 A P 83 24 476 N D D 56 S F 
149 W P 83 35 916 EHJ G G 1 F N t:I:1 
150 M P 83 42 9 EHN D D 43 S S ~ 
151 S R 84 42 277 C X G 0 F N ~ 
152 A R 84 45 558 EGO X G 0 F N 
155 80 6 100 L N H X G 1 F N ~ 
156 U I 80 7 469 Q X G 1 X N ~ 
157 R P 82 20 893 H D D 56 S F 0 
0< 
~ 
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EXPLANATION OF TABLE III 
Column 1: Number assigned to case in study. 
Column 2: Type of business: 
R Retail Trade 
M Manufacturing 
A Agriculture 




W Wholesale Trade 
T Transportation 
U Unclassifiable 
Column 3: Type of property: 
R Real Property 
P Tangible Personal Property 
I Intangible Property 
A Combination of R & T' 
B Combination of R & I 
C Combination of T & I 
D Combination of all three 
Column 4: Citation to case. 









The factor was found to be explicitly 
persuasive to the court. 
The court found the factor present but it 
was less clearly relied upon by the court. 
The factor was found to be explicitly not 
present and that fact was persuasive to the 
court. 
The court found the factor not present but 
that fact was less clearly relied upon by the 
court. 
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The factors are: 
A This is a one asset case. 
C This is an old established business. 
D The management is experienced. 
E The business is being properly run now. 
F The management is competent. 
G The debtor has addressed the causes of bankruptcy. 
H There is a demand for the debtor's product or 
service. 
I There is a reliable forecast of business success.· 
J The business has or will have sufficient capital. 
K This is too early in the case. 
L The debtor is planning a liquidation. 
M The property will add to the value of the business. 
N The property is necessary for the business. 
o The debtor is making progress towards developing a 
plan. 
P There are potential legal challenges to a likely plan. 
Q The debtor has presented no clear evidence. 
Column 6: Court's holding regarding adequate protection: 
D Relief denied. 
G Relief denied conditionally (e.g.: if debtor fails to 
make a payment relief will be granted). 
G Relief granted. 
X Issue not addressed. 
Column 7: Court's holding regarding whether property is 
necessary for an effective reorganization-same abbreviations 
as for column 6. 
Column 8: The data collected regarding the reorganization 
process: 
o Cannot locate attorney. 
1 Attorney has not responded. 
2 Attorney can not recall facts. 
3 Attorney's response is incomplete. 
15 Petition dismissed (reason not apparent). 
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23 Plan confirmed and complied with but actual result 
questionable. 
25 Business operating but success not apparent. 
31 Still in Chapter II-debtor still operating. 
35 Petition dismissed-debtor still operating. 
42 Plan confirmed and debtor is complying. 
43 Debtor has complied with plan. 
44 Successful confirmed plan involves liquidation. 
45 Debtor still in operation-case status not clear. 
53 Still in Chapter II-debtor not operating. 
54 Petition dismissed due to debtor's failure. 
55 Petition dismissed-debtor appears unsuccessful. 
56 Case converted to Chapter 7. 
64 Confirmed plan involves liquidation of debtor. 
65 Debtor no longer in operation-case status unclear. 




X No prediction 
Column 10: The result of the reorganization process: 
S Success 
F Failure 
N Not sufficient data 
TABLE IV A-PREDICTIONS OF SUCCESS 
1 2 
Factor 
A ONE ASSET 
C OLD 












5 6 7 
F N 
1 0 0% 
0 0 100% 
0 1 67% 
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F MGMT 
COMP 6 6 0 0 100% 100% 
G ADDR CAUSE 5 2 3 0 40% 40% 
H DEMAND 10 4 5 1 40% 44% 
I FORECAST 7 4 2 1 57% 67% 
J CAPITAL 5 3 2 0 60% 60% 
K TOO EARLY 8 7 1 0 88% 88% 
L PLAN LIQ 0 0 0 0 
M PROP VALU 6 6 0 0 100% 100% 
N NECESS 22 10 11 1 45% 48% 
0 PROGRESS 13 5 8 0 38% 38% 
OC PROGRESS 9 5 4 0 56% 56% 
PI POT OBJ 4 3 1 0 75% 75% 
QN NO CLEAR E 1 0 1 0 0% 0% 
EN MGMR 
COMP 2 1 1 0 50 50 
GN ADDR CAUSE 2 2 0 0 100 100 
IN FORECAST 1 1 0 0 100 100 
ALL 45 25 17 3 56% 60% 
EXPLANATION OF TABLE IVA 
Column 1: These are the factors identified in Table III. All 
indicates the combined total for all cases in the 
study. In each case the factor is the sentence in 
Table III where the court's opinion recognized a 
"C" or an "I" in column 5 of Table III except for the 
following: 
OC Only those cases where there is a "C" for factor 0 in 
column 5 of Table III. 
PI Only those cases where there is a "I" for factor P in 
- Column 5 of Table III. 
QN, EN, GN. IN Those cases for which there is an "N" or 
"M" in column 5 of Table III. In other 
words, the court predicted success 
although, for example, the court explicitly 
found the debtor had not addressed the 
causes of bankruptcy. For factor Q, one 
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would expect that the presence of the factor 
would be a predictor of failure and that the 
absence might be a predictor of success. 
Column 2: Brief summary of factor. 
Column 3: Number of cases in the study in which the court 
found the factor, predicted success and denied relief 
from the stay on the grounds of property necessary 
for an effective reorganization. 
Column 4: Number of cases in which the result was considered 
a success. 
Column 5: Number of cases in which the result was considered 
a failure. 
Column 6: Number of cases for which sufficient data has not 
been obtained. 
Column 7: Percent of success if all cases in column 6 are 
disregarded. 
Column 8: Percent of success if all cases in column 6 are 
considered failures. 
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TABLE lYE-PREDICTIONS OF FAILURE 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
MIN 
P:F 
Factor R:G S F N 
A ONE ASSET 1 0 1 0 100% 100% 
C OLD 2 0 1 1 100% 100% 
D MGMT EXP 2 0 2 0 100% 100% 
E RUN PROPER 15 1 11 3 93% 92% 
F MGMT COMP 1 0 1 0 100% 100% 
G ADDR CAUSE 14 1 10 3 93% 91% 
H DEMAND 5 0 3 2 100% 100% 
I FORECAST 3 1 2 0 67% 67% 
J CAPITAL 15 1 11 3 93% 92% 
K TOO EARLY 2 1 1 0 50% 50% 
L PLAN LIQ 4 0 2 2 100% 100% 
M PROP VALU 3 0 3 0 100% 100% 
N NECESS 5 0 3 2 100% 100% 
0 PROGRESS 0 0 0 0 
PC POT OBJ 1 0 1 0 100% 100% 
PN POT OBJ 1 0 1 0 100% 100% 
QC NO CLEAR E 9 0 5 4 100% 100% 
NC NECESS 6 1 4 1 83% 80% 
ALL 53 5 34 14 91% 87% 
EXPLANATION OF TABLE IVB 
Only deviations from Table IV A are indicated. 
Column 1: In each case the factor is the sentence in Table III 
where the court's opinion warranted an "Mn or "N~ 
in column 5 except for the following: 
NC, PC, QC Those cases for which there is a nco 
in column 5 of table III. 
PN Only those cases with an "N" (i.e., not an 
"MlI) in Column 5. 
Column 3: Number of cases for which the court found the 
factor, predicted failure and granted relief from the 
stay on the grounds that the property was not 
necessary for an effective reorganization. 
Column 7: Percent of failures if all cases in column 6 are 
disregarded. 
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Column 8: 	 Percent of failures if all cases in column 6 are 
considered failures. 
1 The automatic stay is contained in Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code. 
Essentially it provides for the immediate cessation of actions against the 
debtor and of attempts to obtain property of the debtor. Throughout this 
article, unless otherwise indicated, section numbers are to the Bankruptcy 
Code 11 USC § 101 et seq. 
2 See, e.g., Kennedy, Automatic Stays Under the New Bankruptcy Law, 
12 U Mich JL Ref 3 (1978) (hereinafter Kennedy). (The stay "is indispensable 
to bankruptcy administration. n) 
3 S Rep No. 989, 95th Cong, 2d Seas 54, reprinted in 1978 US Code Cong 
& Admin News 5787, 5840; HR Rep No. 596, 95th Cong, 1st Sess 174 (1977), 
reprinted in 1978 US Code Cong & Admin News 5963, 6135. 
4 See In re Alyucan Interstate Corp., 12 BR 803, 805-806 (BC D Utah 
1981). 
S Courts and commentators have emphasized the dim prospects of 
Chapter 11 reorganizations. See, e.g., In re Timbers of Inwood Forest 
Associates, Ltd., 808 F2d 363, 373 n 17 (CA5 1987), affd 484 US 365 (1988) 
(Statistics "make it amply clear that in the vast majority of Chapter 11 cases, 
the statutory objective of reorganization cannot be realized. The challenge to 
the Qa,nkruptcy courts is to recognize these cases as promptly as possible and 
thereby to limit the administrative expenses. and other costs . . . borne by 
creditors. "); Kennedy, The Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy, 11 U Mich JL Ref 
177, 242 (1978) ("A cold-blooded appraisal of relevant experience probably 
warrants adoption by the courts ofa strong presumption against the likelihood 
of success of any reorganization."). 
Recent studies of the Bankruptcy System. have determined that the 
majority of businesses which fIle under Chapter 11 are destined to fail. One 
such study concluded that "most of the businesses closed only after the 
debtors could not meet operating expenses." Kirkman, The Debtor in Full 
Control, A Case for the Adoption of the Trustee System, 70 Marq L Rev 159, 
170 (1987). 
In response to concern that creditors would be unnecessarily denied 
access to property, Section 362(e) sets a 30-day deadline within which the 
bankruptcy court must rule on the motion for relief. Although that subsection 
provides for the court to make a preliminary ruling after a preliminary 
hearing, Congress amended Section 362(e) in 1984 to provide for an expedited 
hearing process. As amended, if the hearing for relief is only a preliminary 
hearing, the final hearing is to be commenced not later than thirty days after 
the conclusion of the preliminary hearing. One study indicates that courts may 
be ignoring the statutory requirements. See American Bankruptcy Institute, 
Perception and Reality, 94 (1987). In summary to their empirical study of the 
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bankruptcy system the ABI suggested areas for needed study. The first item 
on their list was "Chapter 11-Its use and abuse." Id. at 106. 
There are other vehicles for limiting the use of bankruptcy where 
reorganization through Chapter 11 is hopeless. Cases may be dismissed where 
a filing is deemed to be in "bad faith.· Whether the debtor's reorganization 
effort is impossible may be considered finding good faith. See In re Victory 
Const. Co., 9 BR 549 (BC CD Cal 1981), order vacated 37 BR 222 (Bankr App 
Panel 9th Cir 1984). Cases may be converted to Chapter 7 or dismissed where 
there is • continuing loss to or diminution of the estate and absence of a 
reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation ... " § 1112(b)(1). Bankruptcy Rule 
9011(a) provides that attorneys making bankruptcy filings certify that they 
are "well grounded in fact and ... warranted by existing law ... and that it 
is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass, to cause delay or 
to increase the cost of litigation.· Attorneys who violate this rule are subject to 
monetary sanctions. See, e.g., In re Kinney, 13 CBC2d 957 (BC CD Cal 1985). 
Finally, the court can not approve the Chapter 11 plan unless it determines 
that "[c]onfirmation ... is not likely to be followed by the liquidation, or the 
need for further fmancial reorganization of the debtor . . ." Section 
1129(a)(11). Of course the last provision is of little use to creditors early in the 
reorganization process. 
6 In the Maryland study the stay was litigated in 69% of the Chapter 11 
cases filed. See Line 4, Table II. 
1 The stay can also be the subject of a debtor's action where a creditor or 
other party in interest has already taken action which the debtor alleges is a 
violation of the stay. See, e.g., In re Elder, 12 BR 491 (BC MD Ga 1981). 
8 In the Maryland study 95% of the motions for relief from the stay 
involved efforts to either seize or sell property. See Table II. 
911 USC § 362(d)(1). 
10 United Savings Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, 
Ltd., 484 US 365, 370, 108 S Ct 626, 629 (1988); In re Alyucan Interstate 
Corp., 12 BR 803, (BC D Utah 1981). Although the secured creditor is not 
protected against the risk that interest accrues, it would be protected against 
the risk that interest accrues on senior liens. See, e.g., In re Mulcahy, 5 BR 558 
(BC D Conn 1980). 
11 See United Savings Asstn v. Timbers of Inwood Forest, 484 US 365, 370 
(1988). For example, if the property is worth $1,000,000, the secured debt is 
$950,000 and the property depreciates at $100,000 per year, the court may 
conclude that by virtue of the automatic stay the value of the property will 
soon be insufficient to satisfy the secured debt. There are other threats to 
adequate protection such as the likelihood of casualty loss, theft or misuse of 
the property. As a result of the Timbers decision the inability of the property 
to cover interest which accrues during the pendency of the case is not a risk 
which requires adequate protection. 
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12 A nonexclusive list of methods of providing adequate protection is set 
out in Code Section 361. 
13 The assignment of burdens of proof is found in Code Section 362(g). 
The secured creditor must prove that the debtor does not have equity in the 
property. The debtor must prove that the property is necessary for an effective 
reorganization. 
14 In re Koopmans, 22 BR 395, 396 n 2 (BC D Utah 1982). 
15 See, e.g., In re Spring Garden Foliage, Inc., 15 BR 140, 143 (BC MD Fla 
1981); In re Wolford Enterprises, 11 BR 571, 574 (BC SD W Va 1981); In re 
Fiarer, 34 BR 549 (BC WD Wash 1983) (equity refers to difference between 
value of property which subject to relief ... and all encumbrances against it). 
The Supreme Court in the Timbers case used language which indicates that 
the Court supports this interpretation of the word "equity.' The Court stated 
that § 362(d)(2) comes into play when the movant establishes that "he is an 
undersecured creditor. n United Savings Ass'n v. Timbers, 484 US 365, 376 
(1988). However, the statement was made in a way which did not indicate the 
Court had been aware of the varying interpretations. Therefore, one must 
conclude that the Court was not intending to express an opinion regarding 
whether the protection of § 362(d)(2) is to be extended only to undersecured 
creditors. 
18 In re Cote, 27 BR 510, 513 (BC D Or 1983). 
17 In re Rassier, 85 BR 524, 527 (BC D Minn 1988); Automatic Stay 
Under the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, 17 San Diego L Rev 1113, 1123 (1980); La 
Jolla Mortg. Fund v. Rancho EI Cajon Associates, 18 BR 283, 290(BC SD Cal 
1982); In re Mikole Developers, Inc., 14 BR 524, 525 (BC ED Pa 1981); In re 
Gardner, 14 BR 455, 456 (BC ED Pa 1981); In re Ballasta, 7 BR 883, 885 (BC 
EDPa 1981). The court in the influential Koopmans opinion supported this 
view of "equity" but in that case the junior lienors had interest in other 
property of the estate. Though marshaling this other property may have 
satisfied the junior Henors thus leaving the debtor with equity in the property. 
However, that circumstance (which would permit a finding of equity) was not 
considered by the court since neither party argued the point. In re Koopmans, 
22 BR 395, 396 (BC D Utah 1982). 
18 Professor Jackson discusses the policy underlying the equity require-
ment in terms of the necessity of giving the secured party the incentive to sell 
the property at the highest price. If the secured creditor is oversecured, there 
will be no such incentive. Jackson; The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law 
182 (1986). Similarly junior lienholders would have an incentive to be sure the 
sale produces an adequate price. Junior lienholders who object to the sale could 
bid in such a foreclosure sale if they believe that the price is too low. 
19 Although § 362(d)(2)(B) states that relief will be granted if the property 
is • not necessary for an effective reorganization,' § 362(g) places the burden of 
proof on the debtor, thus effectively requiring the debtor to prove that the 
property "is necessary" for an effective reorganization. See United Savings 
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Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest, 484 US 365, 376 (1988). See In re Robson, 
10 BR 362,365 (BC ND Ala 1981) (since stay is analogous to an injunction 
debtor should be treated as moving party). 
20 The reason for this is that in most cases the property is essential for the 
debtor's business. When the secured creditor is allowed to seize the property 
the debtor is rarely able to continue. See text accompanying note 84, infra. 
21 There has been some dispute regarding whether plans which involve 
liquidation of the debtor constitute successful reorganizations for the purposes 
of 11 USC § 362(d)(2)(B). Technical arguments can be made on both sides. 
See Divack, Chapter 11 Liquidations and the "Necessary To An Effective 
Reorganization n Standard, 93 Com LJ 17 (1988). Recent cases tend to adopt 
the view that liquidation can constitute reorganization. A liquidation plan 
must meet the same requirements as plans involving the continuation of the 
business, that is the plan must provide that the unsecured creditors receive at 
least what they receive in Chapter 7. Therefore a liquidation plan should be 
considered a successful reorganization. 
22 Two recent articles have discussed the history and arguments for each 
test quite thoroughly. See Divack, Chapter 11 Liquidations and the "Neces-
sary To an Effective Reorganization" Standard, 93 Com LJ 17 (1988); 
Comment, Bankruptcy Code Section 362(d)(2): Protecting Turnkey Sale 
Values in Liquidations Under the Bankruptcy Code, 21 Loy LAL Rev 893 
(1988). 
23 The leading case adopting this position is In re Koopmans, 22 BR 395 
(BC D Utah 1982). 
24 See, e.g., In re MCM, Inc., 95 BR 307, 310 (BC D Del 1988). The 
feasibility test does not ignore the word "necessary.' No court has found that 
the debtor is likely to reorganize and thus may keep unnecessary property. For 
example, the court in In re Island Helicopter Corp., stated the test as follows: 
The debtor must show "that its prospects of an effective reorganization are 
well founded and that the integral role that it has assigned to the collateral has 
a justifiable basis. n 63 BR 809, 815 (BC ED NY 1986). 
25 The hypothetical is a high tech version of the oft used "buggy whip," a 
product for which there is no longer a use. The slide rule resembled a ruler and 
was used for rapid mathematical calculations. Not rapid enough, though, since 
it has been replaced by electronic calculators (which can also do operations 
which require memory and can produce hard copy). The hypothetical is based 
on a problem in Warren & Westbrook, The Law of Debtors and Creditors 416 
(1986). 
. 26 See, e.g., In re Vanas, 50 BR 988 (BC ED Mich 1985). 
27 See, e.g., In re Burnet 64 BR 109 (BC ND III 1986). 
28 See, e.g., In re Planned Systems, Inc., 78 BR 852 (BC SD Ohio 1987). 
28 11 USC § 1129(b)(U). 
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30 See, e.g., In re Planned Systems, Inc., 78 BR 852, 866 (BC SD Ohio 
1987) (court rejects H necessity test" since it fails to give meaning to the phrase 
• effective reorganization·). 
31 In re 8th St. Village Ltd. Partnership, 94 BR 993, 996 (BC ND III 
1988). 
32 See, e.g., In re Sunstone Ridge, 51 BR 560, 562 (BC D Utah 1985) ("If 
Congress had meant [feasibility], it would have said it. Congress clearly knew 
how to state such a test, since it did so in 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(1). tt). 
33 Id. at 529. 
34 In re Rassier, 85 BR 524, 528 (BC D Minn 1988). 
35 By contrast the determination of whether or not a case should be 
dismissed which could be decided in part on the likelihood of a successful 
reorganization would not involve an adversary proceeding. 
38 "This means, as many lower courts ... have properly said, that there 
must be a reasonable possibility of a successful reorganization within a 
reasonable time. n United Savings Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forrest 
Associates, Ltd., 484 US 365, 376, 108 S Ct 626, 632 (1988) (emphasis added). 
37 United Savings Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, 
Ltd., 484 US 365, 376 (1988) (emphasis in original). 
38 In re Rassier, 85 BR 524, 528 (BC D Minn 1988). 
39 In re 8th St. Village Ltd. Partnership, 94 BR 993, 996 (BC ND III 
1988). 
40 In re Rassier, 85 BR 524, 528 (BC D Minn 1988); In re Baskerville, 93 
BR 251 (BC D Colo 1988). (court adopted necessity test but took no 
cognizance of Supreme Court ruling). However several recent decisions have 
explicitly stated that Timbers governs, thereby adopting the "feasibility" test. 
See, e.g., In re Grand Sports 86 BR 971 (BC ND Ind 1988); In re Century Inv. 
Fund VII Ltd. Partnership, 96 BR 884, 889 (BC ED Wis 1989); In re 
Chandler, 98 BR 516, 517 (BC D Mont 1988); In re National Real Estate Ltd. 
Partnership II, 87 BR 986, 991 (BC ED Wis 1988); In re Kurth Ranch, 97 BR 
33, 34 (BC D Mont 1989). 
41 In re Rassier, 85 BR 524, 528 (BC D Minn 1988). 
42 This is the position advocated by Thomas Jackson. Jackson, supra n 18 
at 188. 
43 See, e.g., Brosnan, Book Review: The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy 
Law, 6 Temp LQ 885, 902-904 (1988); Nimmer, Negotiated Bankruptcy 
Reorganization Plans, 36 Emory LJ 1010, 1024-1034 (1987). 
44 When assets are dissipated neither the debtor nor unsecured creditors 
profit. Even if the debtor's management or owners profit, the debtor itself is 
not gaining. 
45 For example, although the Bankruptcy Court in In re Rassier adopted 
the necessity test, that Court pointed out that the business in question had 
over $200,000 in contracts for the approaching summer, and that the 
insolvency was the result of "wet weather and a few unprofitable jobs." In re 
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Rassier, 85 BR 524,·526 (BC D Minn 1988). The Rassier Court cites seven 
cases to support the proposition that a growing number of courts advocate the 
"necessity" test. Id at 528. However a number of those cases do not provide 
clear support for that proposition. Hunter Savings Ass'n v. Padgett, 74 BR 65 
(BC SD Ohio 1987), deals with the issue of the appropriateness of a 
liquidation constituting a reorganization. Walter E. Heller, Inc. v. Faires, 34 
BR 549 (BC WD Wash 1983), is decided in favor of the creditor with the 
Court noting that the debtor has no viable business. The Court is persuaded 
that the purpose of § 362(d)(2)(B) is to return property to the secured creditor 
where the petition is filed on the eve of foreclosure. The result in In re Lilyerd, 
49 BR 109 (BC D Minn 1985), is primarily based on the Court's belief that it 
is too early in the case to determine the issue. The Court states, "A debtor's 
burden to show that a creditor's security interest is necessary to an effective 
reorganization can be met at the early stages of a Chapter 11 case by the 
debtor's testimony of his belief, so long as there is some showing that of the 
property is necessary to further the interests of the estate through liquida-
tion.· Id. at 116 (emphasis supplied). The Court also states that, "Because 
there is some possibility that the herd and equipment will generate income 
.... Debtors have met their burden." Id. at 116 (emphasis supplied). 
Moreover, the Court actually granted relief from the stay on the basis of lack 
of adequate protection. 
46 Some courts do seem to end their analysis with the observation that the 
property is necessary to the debtor's business. But it is possible that if those 
courts had been presented with convincing evidencl! that of the total 
hopelessness of the endeavor, they would grant relief from they stay. 
47 See, e.g., the in prospect language added by the Supreme Court noted in 
the text accompanying note 37, supra; In re Miller Development Corp. of 
Louisiana, 71 BR 460, 465 (BC MD La 1987) ("the court must find that the 
Debtor's plan has some as yet unspecified quantum of probability of 
confirmation .• ). 
46 One writer, after painstakingly establishing the appropriate wording of 
a standard, acknowledged that bankruptcy courts will often decide § 362(d)(2) 
stay relief motions by focussing more upon the facts than the law. Divack, 
supra note 21 at 25. To this writer, that is an admission of the failure of 
standards couched in terms like • reasonableness· in this context. 
49 The amount of the secured debt is always the value of the collateral. In 
order to reach § 362(d)(2)(B) it must be determined that the debtor does not 
have equity. Section 362 (d) (2)(A). Therefore we are always dealing with 
situations where the value of the collateral is less than liens against it. In 
Bankruptcy law, although a secured creditor may be undersecured, the secured 
debt is the value of the collateral. The balance is deemed the unsecured debt. 
See § 506(a). 
50 This is similar, of course, to the "Learned Hand" cost benefit analysis 
familiar to all torts students. 
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51 11 USC § 362(g). 
52 Throughout this discussion reference to 51 % is used as a shorthand way 
of saying "greater than 50%." The latter language is more precise. For 
example. 50.001% is greater than 50% and would therefore represent a 
situation where it is more likely than not that the debtor will reorganize 
successfully. 
63 See, e.g., Radford, Statistical Error and Legal Error, 846 Loy LAL Rev 
843, 845-846 (1988). (The civil litigation standard of proof by a preponderance 
of the evidence requires a probability of at least 51%.) Of course the court 
would also have to find that the property was necessary for such a 
reorganization. 
54 Some would argue that this view of tbe secured creditor above the fray 
is belied by the practice in bankruptcy courts. See, e.g., Baird & Jackson, 
Corporate Reorganization and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interest, 
51 U Chi L Rev 97 (1984): "A few [bankruptcy judges] seem to show either an 
inability or an unwillingness to comprehend the possibility that secured credit 
may be something more than a perverse and unfair creature of state law that 
should be thwarted at every turn." 
55 As one commentator has said, "The proper issue in bankruptcy cases 
. . . is not whether state law rights should have a role. They clearly do and 
clearly should. Rather, the policy issue concerns defining the extent and the 
conditions under which federal loss allocation policy should alter state law 
outcomes." Nimmer, supra note 43 at 1014 n 5. 
68 In the Timbers case the Court exhibited no concern with restricting the 
secured creditor's rights to those allowed by the statutory language. The Court 
emphasized: "That secured creditors do not bear one kind of reorganization 
cost hardly means that they bear none of them.· United Savings Ass'n v. 
Timbers of Inwood Forest, 484 US 365, 379 (1988). 
One writer has recognized that the generally accepted definition of 
"equity' in § 362(d)(2), the difference between the value of the property and 
the amount of all liens, demonstrates tbat § 362(d)(2) is not to be applied "in 
an isolated context, merely in terms of the debtor and the single, particular 
creditor seeking relief" but rather is to be applied with the interest of other 
creditors in consideration. Comment, supra note 22 at 912. 
57 See Jackson, supra note 18 at 22: "[Bankruptcy] should act to insure 
that the rights that exist are vindicated to the extent possible. Only in this 
way can bankruptcy law minimize the conversion cost of transferring an 
insolvent debtor's assets to its creditors.' Id. at 26: "Fashioning a distinct 
bankruptcy rule . . . creates incentives for the group advantaged by the 
distinct bankruptcy rule to use the bankruptcy process even though it is not in 
the interest of the owners as a group.' 
68 There have been a number of suggestions that the law of personal 
property security interests should be federal. As one writer has pointed out 
"bankruptcy is the chief risk to which suc~ law is directed." Philips, Secured 
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Credit and Bankruptcy: A Call For The Federalization of Personal Property 
Security Law, 50 Law & Contemp Probs 54, 77 (1987). 
118 Even a modified plan must meet this requirement. Code Section 
1127(b). 
60 See In re Vanas, 50 BR 988, 1001 (BC ED Mich 1985) ("This is the 
most difficult issue because it requires the court to speculate about the future 
.... "); In re Greiman, 45 BR 574, 581 (BC ND Iowa 1984) ("Assessing the 
evidence in stay litigation is an inexact science at best. So much depends on 
future trends .... "). Some courts have expressed confidence in the judge's 
ability to predict. See, e.g., In re Sunstone Ridge Associates, 51 BR 560, 563 
(BC D Utah 1985) ("Bankruptcy courts generally have the expertise and 
experience to quite accurately predict the fmal outcome of a bankruptcy 
case."). 
One reason that § 361 prevents the use of an administrative priority for 
adequate protection is that Congress questioned the ability of courts to 
forecast the outcome of cases. In re Koopmans 22 BR 395, 404 n 2 (BC D Utah 
1982). 
It could be argued that even in determining whether an event occurred in 
the past requires the finder offact to make a judgment about probabilities. See 
Radford, Statistical Error and Legal Error, 21 Loy LAL Rev 843, 845 (1988). 
61 Thus empirical research could play the same role in assisting courts in 
achieving their goal as empirical research can help in establishing sentencing 
guidelines. See Forest, Rhodes & Wellford, Sentencing ,and Social Science, 7 
Hofstra L Rev 366 (1979). 
62 The reasoning is the same as that advanced by Judge Wald in 
discussing judicial review of regulatory policy where economic analysis is 
implicated. • Once a regulatory scheme has been in place for a few years, one 
can often evaluate it and determine whether the earlier predictions were borne 
out.· Wald, Judicial Review of Economic Analysis, 1 Yale J Reg 43,56 (1983). 
63 Professor Lynn Lopucki conducted a study of all of the Chapter 11 
cases filed in the Western District of Missouri from October 1,1979 to October 
1, 1980. See Lopucki, The Debtor in Full Control-Systems Failure Under 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code?, 57 Am Bankr LJ 99 (1983) and Lopucki, 
"The Debtor in Full Control-Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code (Second Installment), 57 Amer Bankr LJ 247 (1983) (both 
articles hereinafter referred to as the Missouri Study). The Missouri Study 
involved the examination of court files about three years after the cases had 
been filed. Data was collected concerning the type of business, the reasons for 
filing, the extent of creditor opposition to Debtor behavior, the nature of 
proposed and confirmed plan, the disposition of cases and the fate of the 
business. Id. at 100-101. The general conclusion was that a small number of 
businesses succeed (26%) and that creditors exercised little control over the 
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A second study by Jerome R. Kerkman essentially duplicated the 
Missouri Study by examining the Chapter 11 fllings in the Eastern District of 
Wisconsin during the year of 1982. See Kirkman, supra note 5, at 159 
(hereinafter referred to as the Wisconsin Study). The Wisconsin Study 
essentially corroborated the findings of the Missouri Study, concluding that "a 
lack of creditor participation in Chapter 11 proceedings had caused a systems 
failure in the Western District of Missouri." rd. at 163. 
In a comparative study of bankruptcy fllings it was determined that the 
passage Bankruptcy Reform Act which became effective in 1979 may have 
caused an increase in the number of business bankruptcy fllings. The study 
was not able to identify the particular code sections responsible for the 
changes. Marsh & Cheng, "The Impact of the Bankruptcy Reform Act on 
Business Bankruptcy Filings," 36 Ala L Rev 515, 538-539 (1985). 
In a study conducted by the Brookings Institute under the Bankruptcy 
Act it was determined that most business bankruptcies end in failure and that 
• Creditors get so little out of bankruptcy proceedings that they have almost no 
incentive to be interested.· Stanley & Girth, Bankruptcy: Problem, Process, 
Reform, 6, 10 (1971). The study was based on the analysis of bankruptcy 
statistics and an examination of files and interviews regarding 50 business 
bankruptcy cases. 
64 See, e.g., Kirkman supra note 5. "Future researchers might be able to 
identify the characteristics of businesses which enable them to succeed in 
reorganization proceedings with sufficient precision to reliably predict which 
will do so.' Both studies did identify some factors which seemed to correlate 
with success. See the discussion of my study and the factors analyzed in Part 
Ill. Emperical Studies. 
65 Files are moved to "dead storage" as space requires. Those flles would 
have been unavailable for our study. 
86 Every fourth case on the list of Chapter 11 bankruptcies flled was 
selected. There is no evidence that this method of selection produces a sample 
which is representative of the population. However, there is no apparent 
reason why such a method would produce an unrepresentative sample. 
67 Since the stay prevents a wide variety of actions against the debtor, it is 
necessary to seek relief even if there is not a request to seize property. But as 
the statistics bear out, the seizure of property is the main goal of motions for 
relief. 
86 Wherever the language of the motion indicated that there was an 
allegation of lack of equity and lack of necessity for the property I concluded 
that Code § 362(d)(2) was involved. The language was not always crystal clear. 
69 Whenever a proportion from a sample is used for the population as a 
whole it has a margin of error. For example, suppose there is a population of 
100 bankruptcy cases and 40 ofthem are sampled. Suppose 20 (or 50%) of the 
sample involved motions for relief from the stay. We might want to conclude 
that 50% of the population (the 100 cases) involved motions for relief. We 
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would have to qualify that conclusion in two ways. First, we would select a 
confidence interval. A confidence interval of 95% is recognized in most 
empirical research. In other words, for all conclusions in this article we say 
that they have a 95% probability of being true. Second, we need to know the 
margin of error (often referred to as precision). Given the 100 population, 40 
sample and 50% proportion we can conclude that the margin of error is 12% of 
the population or 12. Hence we can say with 95% confidence tbat the number 
of cases in the population in which a motion for relief was flled is 50 + 12. 
The formula used to reach that conclusion was: 
e X 1 
" n1 --w­
2 
Where e = precision (margin of error), n = size of sample and N = size of 
population and Z = 1.96. For the balance of the calculations involving margin 
of error the following formula is used: 
Z2 P (1 - P) N 
n = -------------- ­
Z2 P (1 - P) + Ne2 
Where 
n = sample size 
Z == 1.96 
P = proportion 
N = population size 
e = margin of error 
Yamane, Statistics 886 (2d ed 1967). 
70 During the period of the Maryland Study, national Chapter 11 fllings 
totaled around 20,000. See Table II. The total Chapter 11 fllings for 1988 were 
17,690. Administrative Office of the Courts, Federal Judicial Workload 
Statistics During the Twelve Month Period ended December 31, 1988 
(undated). Although separate statistics are maintained for business and 
nonbusiness fllings, this study used the total Chapter 11 fllings statistics 
because our sample was taken from all Chapter 11 fllings. For the examples in 
the text, 20,000 is used as the approximate number of filings. For the purposes 
for which the numbers are being used, that approximation is sufficient. 
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71 Of course the number of cases could never be negative. So the range 
here would necessarily be 3,235 to O. 
72 The calculation assumes the following: 20,000 cases are filed annually; 
the issue arises about 1,500 times; courts divide evenly granting and denying 
relief; they base their decisions on 10 different factors; each factor is used in . 
one tenth of the cases, and half of the predictions of success prove correct. 
Given those conditions there would be about 33 correct predictions of success 
for each factor. If the above statements were true of the general population of 
bankruptcy filings, a sample 5,000 cases would reveal that fact with a margin 
of error of 19 cases and a sample of 10,000 would produce a margin of error of 
11 cases. The latter number would probably be acceptable. However, if a factor 
occurs in smaller numbers, a larger sample would be needed (e.g., 20 successful 
predictions of success in the general population would require a study 10,000 
to yield a margin of error of 9 cases). Since the goal of the study would be to 
compare results for predictions based on various factors, such small margins of 
error would be essential. 
73 However, it would be possible to test the general conclusion that courts 
decide the issue about 1,300 + 200 times a year with a sample of about 2,100 
bankruptcy flIes. 
74 It must be emphasized that in order to determine if the issue of whether 
the property is necessary for an effective reorganization is addressed by the 
court cannot be determined by just looking at the court file itself. The motion 
flIe must be located and the papers analyzed to determine whether the judge 
had to decide the issue. 
75 The complete list of statements is provided in Table III and the 
statements are discussed in notes 86-90 and accompanying text infra. 
76 In each instance the lawyer who represented the debtor was sent a 
survey form asking the status of the business, the property and the bankruptcy 
case. If the lawyer did not respond to the first letter, one follow up letter was 
sent. If the lawyer did not respond to the follow up letter, there was an attempt 
to contact the lawyer by phone. Where it did not appear that the debtor's 
attorney would cooperate, an attempt was made to contact the attorney for the 
secured creditors following the same procedure. 
77 Although, in the Maryland Study, there were only a few decisions in 
which the court clearly dealt with the issue of 362(d)(2), none of those 
decisions are reported. Moreover, the presence of reported appeals of decisions 
on the issue where the actual decision of the bankruptcy court is not reported 
indicates that there are an undetermined number of decisions at the 
bankruptcy court level which are not reported. See, e.g., In re 8th St. Village 
Ltd. Partnership, 94 BR 993 (Be ND III 1988). 
78 See, e.g., In re Little Puffer Billy, Inc., 16 BR 174 (Be D Or 1981); In 
re, Hurricane Resort, 16 BR 598 (Be SD Fla 1981); In re Amarex, Inc., 30 BR 
763 (Be WD Okla 1983) (court alludes to factors not mentioned in the 
decision). 
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79 See note 63, supra. Also see Stanley & Girth note 63, supra at 115. 
80 It was felt that to request such documentation would reduce the 
likelihood that lawyers would respond. 
81 In fact in one instance the study relies on a phone conversation with 
the debtor's wife. Case No. 19, Table III. 
82 For example, in case No. 14, the study revealed that the bankruptcy: 
case was eventually dismissed and the real estate development ceased but that 
all unsecured creditors had been paid. The case was classified as a • success. " 
In case No. 17, the debtor was liquidated but this appeared due to questionable 
conduct of the owner of the property. The case was classified as a "failure." In 
case No. 20, the case was, at the time of the study, still open, but a trustee had 
been appointed, the business was no longer operating and the principals of the 
debtor seem to have lost interest in the case. The case was classified as a 
failure. See Table III. 
83 Although the standard expressed in this sentence is plausible and could 
be adopted. For reasons discussed in this paragraph such a goal may be more 
easily measured. 
84 Kennedy, supra note 5 at 242. See, e.g., In re Planned Systems, Inc., 78 
BR 852, 866 (BC SD Ohio 1987) (grant ofrelief would be "death knell" to a 
debtor's rehabilitation efforts). A number of attorneys in responding to the 
study added comments to the effect that they felt the debtor could have 
survived but that the Court's action doomed the debtor's chances. See Table 
III case No.4, case No.5. However, note also case No. 13 where even after 
foreclosure sale but prior to order confirming sale -debtor was able to 
restructure. 
85 In re Planned Systems, Inc., 78 BR 852, 866 (BC SD Ohio 1987). Some 
of the attorneys who responded to the National Study indicated they felt that 
the granting of relief prevented a likely successful reorganization. Cases No. 4 
and No. 16 Table III. 
86 See Missouri Study, supra note 63 at 100; Kirkman, supra note 5. 
87 In fact where courts ignored the "technical" characteristics they 
seemed to have high success rates. The conclusion in the text is to some extent 
supported by the Brookings Institute survey of the causes of business failures. 
See Stanley & Girth supra note 63 at 110-112. 
88 For example, case No.4: The Court noted that if the secured creditor 
"persists with its apparent desire for liquidation, this debtor will not be able to 
confirm a rehabilitative plan of reorganization." However, the Court stated 
that "it is hoped that the two will work things out .... " In re Weiser, Inc., 74 
BR 111, 116 (BC SD Iowa 1986). In fact the case was dismissed after an 
agreement and the debtor is still operating. Table III. 
89 This approach is consistent with the language of the Supreme Court in 
the Timbers case. See In re Planned Systems, Inc. 78 BR 852, 866 (BC SD 
Ohio 1987). 
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90 This was a factor under the former Bankruptcy Act. See Kennedy, 
supra note 5 at 250. Lack of diligence can be used as evidence of lack of good 
faith or for dismissal under § 1112(b). 
91 The rule could also include court action in other areas where the court 
must predict the success or failure of the reorganization. That is the reason for 
the bracketed language. See note 5 supra. 
92 The factors (a through 1) are suggestive and should be revised as it 
becomes apparent that other factors need investigation. 
93 The language in parentheses is required since the rule is not intended to 
require a legal standard. 
94 This article advocates the adoption of a standard that businesses 
should he allowed to continue where there is a 51 % chance of survival. The 
writer would hope that the courts would adopt that standard. However, the 
empirical study proposed and the use of that study discussed in this article do 
not require that particular standard. Bankruptcy courts could adopt some 
other standard. However, as discussed, some standard must be used either 
explicitly or implicitly. 
95 28 USC § 2075 provides in pertinent part that: "The Supreme Court 
shall have the power to prescribe by general rules, the forms of process . . . 
and the practice and procedure in cases under Title 11. Such rules shall not 
abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right." A requirement similar to 
that imposed by the proposed rule is Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure (which is also adopted at Bankruptcy Rule 7052) which requires the 
court to set forth findings of fact and Federal Rule 65(d) (adopted as 
Bankruptcy Rule 7065) which requires that, "Every order granting an 
injunction and every restraining order shall set forth the reasons for its 
issuance .... " 
96 See 28 USC § 586(a)(3): "Each U.S. Trustee ... shall (3) supervise the 
administration of cases and trustees in cases under Chapter 7, 11, or 13 of 
Title 11, by .... (G) monitoring the progress of cases under Title 11 and 
taking such actions as the United States trustee deems to be appropriate to 
prevent undue delay in such progress . . .. n 
97 The Bankruptcy Code provides that "The United States trustee may 
raise and may appear and be heard on any issue in any case or proceeding 
under this title but may not he heard on any issue in any case or proceeding 
under this title but may not file a plan pursuant to section 1121(c) of this 
title. " 
Collier on Bankruptcy advocates a rather broad interpretation of the 
trustee's powers. That treatise states that, "Administration of cases includes 
management of the affairs of the estate and all activities necessary to 
accomplishment of the statutory objectives. 6 Collier on Bankruptcy. 1/6.18 at 
6-76 (15th Ed). Referring to the 28 USC § 586(a)(3)(G) Collier states that 
"this duty reflects the experience of the pilot program, under which the United 
States Trustees took an active role when a debtor showed no signs of progress 
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toward plan confirmation or was otherwise abusing the bankruptcy process. » 
Id. at 6-85. 
98 Writers who have done extensive empirical research in bankruptcy law 
state that, »empirical research has played almost no role in the development of 
bankruptcy policy.· Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook, The Use of Empirical 
Data In Formulating Bankruptcy Policy, 50 Law & Contemp Probs 195 
(Spring 1987). They argue that "empirical research is vitally needed in the 
formation of bankruptcy policy and that it is possible to develop empirical 
data that will become an indispensable part of the process.· Id. at 196. 
99 "Legislative policy making is the focus of this article. Of course, the 
bankruptcy courts also develop much of our bankruptcy policy. . .. Separate 
study of the issues raised and the data that are needed for judicial decision 
making seems most appropriate.· Id. at 198, n 7. It should be noted that this 
article appears to be referring to judicial decisionmaking in resolving issues of 
law while the study proposed here would be used in resolving factual issues. 
100 Walker & Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science 
In Law, 73 Va L Rev 559 (1987). 
101 Id. at 570. 
102 See United States v. Leon, 468 US 897 (1984). The summary of the 
cases discussed in notes 102-106, infra are taken from Walker & Monahan 
supra note 100 at 562-567. 
103 See Processed Plastic Co. v. Warner Communications, Inc., 675 F2d 
852 (CA7 1982). 
104 State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz 281, 297, 660 P2d 1208, 1224 (1983) (en 
banc) (reversing the trial court's suppression of the evidence). 
105 State v. Myers, 359 NW2d 604 (Minn 1984). 
106 Walker, supra note 100 at 573. See, e.g., In re Robson, 10 BR 362, 369 
(BC ND Ala 1981) (Court takes judicial knowledge of developments in another 
related bankruptcy case to support the secured creditor's position). 
107 Neale & Liebert, Science and Behavior: An Introduction to Methods 
of Research (2d ed 1980) excerpted in Monahan & Walker, Social Science in 
Law 27 (1985) (hereinafter referred to as Monahan). 
108 Obviously any study may ignore a variable which is significant. But at 
least the authors of such a study could defend their refusal to investigate a 
particular variable on grounds based on a reasoned causal explanation. 
109 It may be possible by the use of regression analYSis to make some 
conclusions regarding combinations of factors. 
110 Monahan & Walker, supra note 107 at 39. 
111 "The dependent variable (actually there may be several dependent 
variables, but that is unusual) is that quantity or aspect of nature whose 
change or different states the researcher wants to understand or explain or 
predict.· Simon, Basic Research Methods in Social Science (2d ed 1978), 
excerpted in Monahan & Walker supra. note 107 at 40 (emphasis in original). 
In the proposed study two dependent variable would have to be considered. 
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Judges would want to know to what extent a factor predicted or did not predict 
success or failure. A business which did not succeed would not necessarily be a 
business which failed since it might be a case for which no resolution has yet 
occurred. 
An independent variable "is a variable whose effect upon the dependent 
variable you are trying to understand." [d. 
112 Monahan & Walker supra note 107 at 41. 
113Id. at 42. 
114 See text accompanying note 82, supra. 
115 See Monahan & Walker, supra note 107 at 47. 
116 For example, for data which would appear rather clear cut, such as the 
value of assets, the judge take some testimony under oath to arrive at a 
conclusion. The judge could not merely take the information from the 
schedules as filed. In re East Redley Corp., 4 BR 288,290 (BC ED Pa 1980). 
117 For example recent studies classify business by size. Yet the data is 
taken from bankruptcy filings which may be inaccurate. The judge however, is 
in a position to question relevant participants regarding size. Similarly, the 
proposal advanced in this article differs from that advanced by Sullivan, 
Warren and Westbrook in that the study suggested here requires judicial 
determination of facts rather than just an improved method of collection of 
data from bankruptcy files. See Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook, supra note 98 
at 222-223. 
116 See Monahan & Walker, supra note 107 at 50. 
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